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THE TAX BENEFITS OF LIABILITIES-
THEIR RISE AND FALL
by
Walter D. Schwidetzky *
IABILITIES play a crucial role in determining the tax impact of an
investment. Taxpayers may include purchase money liabilities in the
basis of acquired property, thereby increasing the availability of de-
preciation and other tax benefits.' These tax advantages encourage taxpay-
ers to maximize the use of debt, while the associated financial risks lead
them to minimize their economic exposure. 2 In an effort to resolve these
conflicting goals, taxpayers have used nonrecourse debt, as well as debt of
dubious authenticity. 3 The courts and Congress have attempted to circum-
scribe these efforts. The "at risk rules" of section 465 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code play a leading role in this regard. 4
The basis rules, which measure the availability of deductions in the first
instance, and the at risk rules, which may thereafter intervene to deny de-
ductions, have caused confusion. Courts have made decisions under one set
of rules when they should have used the other set.5 The passive loss rules of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986,6 which generally limit the loss deductions from
passive activities to income from passive activities, affect the prominence of
the basis and at risk rules.7 Prior to the taxable disposition of an investment
* B.A., J.D., M.B.A., LL.M. (Taxation), University of Denver. Assistant Professor of
Law, University of Baltimore. The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial comments of
Professor John Lynch, University of Baltimore School of Law, and the research assistance of
Messrs. Daniel Guy and Bruce Cweiber (class of 1987 and 1988, respectively, University of
Baltimore School of Law) and the secretarial skills and endless patience of Barbara Jones.
1. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1947); see also United States v. Hendler,
303 U.S. 564, 567 (1938) (another corporation's assumption and payment of taxpayer's debt
resulted in taxable gain to taxpayer).
2. See Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'g, 64 T.C.
752 (1975); Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 766 (1973); Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47
T.C. 340, 348 (1966).
3. Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 1976) (limited partner
not entitled to interest deduction or depreciation reduction for property it purchased and
leased back and for which partner did not pay nor show as an investment), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 827 (1976).
4. I.R.C. § 465 (West Supp. 1987). The Internal Revenue Code will hereinafter be re-
ferred to as the Code.
5. See infra notes 170-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pritchett v. Commis-
sioner, 85 T.C. 580 (1985), rev'd, 827 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1987).
6. I.R.C. § 469 (West Supp. 1987).
7. Id.; see Brode, Structuring Real Estate Entities in View of the New Limitation on Loss
Rules, 65 J. TAX'N 290, 291 (1986) (overall effect of limitation on loss rules is to limit severely
availability of losses or credits from tax shelter).
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interest, the passive loss rules often will make the at risk and basis rules
superfluous. Little need will exist to determine whether the at risk or basis
provisions limit loss deductions when the passive loss rules prohibit them
outright.
The at risk and basis rules, however, continue to be of the utmost impor-
tance. The passive loss rules only apply to passive activities, 8 leaving the at
risk and basis provisions to impact loss deductions for undertakings in which
the taxpayer may "materially participate."9 Further, taxpayers may deduct
passive losses from one passive activity from passive income from another
passive activity. For example, participants in a highly leveraged real estate
limited partnership may deduct passive losses from passive income attributa-
ble to a successful oil and gas limited partnership. 10 One must address the
basis and at risk rules in order to ascertain the amount of passive losses that
may be used to offset passive income.
This Article discusses liabilities in the context of the basis, at risk, and
passive loss rules. Particular emphasis is given to the interplay between
those rules, as well as to recent Tax Court cases that demonstrate that judges
are not immune to the difficulties this area presents. The Article also pro-
vides a critique, particulary of the passive loss rules, and recommendations
for reform.
I. BASIS
A. The Basics of Basis
Basis measures the taxpayer's investment: the cost of a property." This
measure is important because under our system of taxation the federal gov-
ernment generally taxes a taxpayer on gross income minus the costs associ-
ated with earning it.12 Those costs might involve materials, such as legal
pads in a law office, that are used promptly after acquisition. Alternatively,
they might consist of property with an extended life, such as a word proces-
sor. The Internal Revenue Code usually permits an immediate deduction of
the full cost of the materials since they are used currently. 13 It would not be
appropriate to allow a current deduction of the cost of property with an
extended life, such as the word processor. Users will only consume such
property gradually, and the property will generate income for a period of
years. In order to properly match income and expenses, therefore, a tax-
payer should allocate the cost or basis of the property to annual income only
to the extent its value declines. 4 The Internal Revenue Service accom-
plishes this match of declining property value with income, with dramatic
8. I.R.C. § 469(c)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
9. Id.; see infra notes 304-38 and accompanying text.
10. I.R.C. § 469(d)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (aggregate losses from passive activities must
exceed aggregate gains from such activities.
11. Id. § 1012 (1982).
12. Id. § 63 (1987).
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1958).
14. United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 303-04 (1927); B. BITTKER, FUNDAMENTALS
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 10.1 (1983).
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modifications, by the depreciation system. Since determining whether and
the extent to which property has declined in value is impractical, the cost
recovery system assumes that properties depreciate at various specified
rates. 15
Depreciation and various other income deductions associated with the
property reduce basis. 16 Additional investments in the property can increase
basis. As a result of these potential fluctuations, the concept of "adjusted
basis" emerged. On the taxable disposition of property, taxpayers report
gain or loss depending on the difference between the adjusted basis of the
property and the amount realized on the sale. 17
Obviously the calculation of basis is critical. Taxpayers typically want as
a high a basis as possible, not only to increase the availability of current
deductions, but also to limit the gain, or increase the loss, on a later taxable
disposition. The basis includes the amount of the taxpayer's equity invest-
ment in the property.18
B. Liabilities
Liabilities constitute a more difficult problem when calculating basis. Ar-
guably, one should not include liabilities in basis because they do not repre-
sent a taxpayer's current investment. At the time the taxpayer incurs the
liabilities, it is not the taxpayer who is making the outlay, but the lender.
The taxpayer may, in the case of recourse debt,19 be obligated to make an
investment in the future when the debt matures. The obligation is not a
current one, however, and a question arises as to whether the taxpayer
should be allowed basis before the investment occurs. In the case of nonre-
course debt that question becomes even more pertinent, since the taxpayer
possesses no personal obligation to pay the debt at all. Instead the lender
relies on the activity's future income or, if all else fails, the secured property
itself to ensure payment of the debt. Why should a taxpayer receive basis for
an investment he has not yet made and is not personally obligated to make?
The issue is one of timing. When should the taxpayer's basis be credited: at
the time the property is acquired or when the liability is paid and the invest-
ment is in fact made?20
From a purely theoretical standpoint, a cogent argument exists that basis
should not be increased except to the extent the taxpayer actually pays the
principal portion of the debt. Only with this requirement will the tax system
insure that the investment will be made.2' If taxpayers do not initially in-
15. I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (West Supp. 1987).
16. Id. § 1016.
17. Id. § 1011 (1987).
18. Id. § 1012.
19. For a good description of recourse and nonrecourse loans, see Fielder, Drilling Funds
and Nonrecourse Loans-Some Tax Questions, 24 INST. ON OIL & GAS TAX'N 527, 535-36
(1973).
20. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Halpern, Liabilities and Cost Basis: Some
Fundamental Considerations, 7 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 334, 336 (1980); Landis, Liabilities and
Purchase Price, 27 TAX LAW. 67, 68 (1973).
21. Taxpayers have included liabilities in basis with surprisingly little discussion. Nothing
1987]
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clude liabilities in basis, however, they must constantly adjust their basis as
they make principal payments on the debt. Depreciation deductions would
vary, potentially erratically, as basis varied. Abuse certainly would not be
avoided. Taxpayers could accelerate, or retard, payment of debt, manipulat-
ing basis and associated deductions depending on their varying tax picture,
which potentially could reduce the amount of overall taxes paid.
The tax system generally attempts to have tax consequences follow eco-
nomic consequences. 22 Refusing to include liabilities in basis could violate
this principle. Ordinarily only payments made toward the end of the loan
period materially reduce the outstanding principal balance. 23 Further, quite
frequently a property's expected life is close to the expected payout period
on the loan.24 Tying depreciation allowances to principal payments, there-
fore, could result in the bulk of the depreciation deductions being taken to-
ward the end of a property's life. This result appears inconsistent with
economic depreciation, the bulk of which typically occurs early in a prop-
erty's life. 25
Fundamental to the United States income tax system is a desire to match
income and expenses.26 As the assets the taxpayer acquired with the debt
generate income, should not the taxpayer be permitted to deduct costs asso-
ciated with that income that, in this context, represents the amount by which
the property depreciates in value? The depreciation will be a function of the
total cost of the property, part of which may have been paid with debt. 27
Any losses incurred are also a function of the total outlays, which include
proceeds from loans. Based on these considerations and others, courts have
always included purchase money recourse debt in basis. 28
One does not significantly alter the analysis if nonrecourse debt is used.
about this issue is contained in the legislative history to I.R.C. § 1012 (1982) or to its predeces-
sor, I.R.C. § 202 of The Revenue Act of 1918.
22. B. BITTKER, supra note 14, 8.1-8.5; see I.R.C. § 162 (West Supp. 1987) (provides
deductions for business expenses).
23. THORNDIKE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL TABLES 5-1 table 5 (1983
Yearbook) (mortgage amortization schedules).
24. See Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 762-65 (1973); see also infra notes 36-55
(discusses Bolger). In Bolger the mortgage term equalled the lease term, which probably equal-
led the property's useful life. See also Lurie, Bolger's Building: The Tax Shelter That Wore No
Clothes, 28 TAX L. REV. 355, 370 (1973).
25. For an excellent discussion of depreciation methods and why an accelerated rate of
depreciation may more accurately reflect income, see Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-Tax
Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30-43
(1979).
26. See generally I.R.C. § 63 (West Supp. 1987) (taxable income equals gross income less
certain deductions).
27. See Kahn, supra note 14, at 25 (discussion of accelerated depreciation as proper de-
duction in determining net income).
28. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 11 (1946) (property's basis equals amount
paid for property; no decrease for mortgages on property); United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S.
564, 566 (1938) (discharge of debt by assumption of debt and obligation constituted income);
Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 770 (1973) (amount of mortgages encumbering property
included in basis). Some courts have included liabilities in basis even when not paid. See
Amphitrite Corp. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1140, 1143 (1951) (elimination of indebtedness did
not authorize reduction in basis); Blackstone Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 801, 804-
05 (1949) (taxpayer's basis prior to year of purchase of tax liens should include full amount of
[Vol. 41
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Assuming the debt and purchase prices are bona fide, which is occasionally
questionable, depreciation will continue to be a function of the property's
cost, and the practical and conceptual issues remain the same. For these
reasons, among others, the venerable Crane v. Commissioner 29 held that
nonrecourse debt is included in basis, in the process causing it to be one of
the most cited Supreme Court tax cases in history. 30 Including liabilities in
basis does not result in a system that works perfectly, and abuses can arise.
A host of judicial rules and Code provisions have been created to help stem
the efforts of excessively creative taxpayers. 31
C. Boosting Basis
Through the use of liabilities, taxpayers can generate basis levels far in
excess of their equity investments. 32 The eventual need for repayment often
offsets this potential benefit. From the taxpayer's, if not the government's,
point of view, one would prefer to avoid that financial exposure while still
obtaining the basis increase. The use of nonrecourse debt makes this avoid-
ance of financial exposure possible. If the taxpayer's interest principally lies
in tax benefits rather than economic benefits, an incentive exists to maximize
basis by maximizing the use of nonrecourse debt, potentially in excess of a
property's or activity's economic value.3 3 Such efforts undermine the entire
conceptual underpinning in permitting the inclusion of nonrecourse liabili-
ties in basis. It is one thing to permit their inclusion when they are incurred
on the assumption that the activity's income, or the collateral itself, will pay
the underlying debt. It is quite another to allow one to add nonrecourse
liabilities to basis when the prospect for their payment is highly questiona-
ble. Two cases highlight this concern.
1. Mayerson and Bolger
The facts in Mayerson v. Commissioner34 strikingly demonstrate the ad-
vantages of nonrecourse debt. In Mayerson the taxpayer acquired deprecia-
ble property in exchange for $10,000 in cash and a $332,500 ninety-nine
year, interest bearing, nonrecourse purchase money mortgage and mortgage
note. The court, in a somewhat cryptic decision, found the debt obligation
to be bona fide and held that the purchasers were entitled to include the debt
such liens). For an alternative proposal, see Landis, supra note 20, at 84 (assumption of liabili-
ties based on more conventional tax accounting rules would introduce degree of certainty.
29. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
30. Id. at 11; see Halpern, supra note 20, at 337 n. 12; Landis, supra note 20, at 67; Lurie,
supra note 24, at 370.
31. See infra notes 66-196 and accompanying text.
32. Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 770 (1973) (taxpayer should include mortgage
encumbering property in basis, regardless of whether taxpayer assumes personal liability for
mortgage); Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340, 352 (1966) (taxpayer should include
purchase-money mortgage lien in basis).
33. See Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1976) (absence of per-
sonal liability on debt reduces chance that genuine debt obligation arises and does not justify
interest deduction).
34. 47 T.C. 340 (1966).
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obligation in basis. 35
The second case is the much celebrated case of Bolger v. Commissioner.36
In Bolger the defendant created tax shelters to take advantage of the acceler-
ated depreciation deductions available for real estate at the time the parties
structured the transactions. 37 Bolger would form a financing corporation,
capitalize it with $1,000, and have the corporation acquire a building. 38 The
corporation normally would enter into a long-term, triple net lease of the
building with a publicly held corporation. The corporation borrowed the
funds for the purchases from institutional lenders, who took the building and
the lease as security. The lessees made lease payments directly to the lend-
ers. The leases, which were probably for terms equal to or in excess of the
lives of the buildings, 39 obligated the lessee to make lease payments even if
the buildings were destroyed, were coupled with an option to purchase, re-
quired the lessee to indemnify the lessor for any liability to third parties that
might arise with regard to the building, and generally shifted responsibility
for the building to the lessees. After purchase and lease of the building, the
corporation would convey title to Bolger. 4° He would accept the property
subject to, but without assuming any obligation on, the indebtedness. This
scheme made the indebtedness, which was nominally recourse, effectively
nonrecourse. Bolger was not liable for the debt, and the corporation did not
posses any significant assets from which to pay it.41 Bolger, as the purported
owner of the building, included the liability in his basis. He took accelerated
depreciation and interest deductions that, even after the inclusion in income
of the rental fees, provided a large reduction in taxable income.
Bolger, at the outset, possessed no equity interest in the building and
therefore no personal investment. The rental income received and debt pay-
ments made occurred over similar time frames and roughly offset one an-
other, so little chance existed of Bolger receiving any net cash proceeds
during the buildings' useful lives.42 Consequently, the buildings would con-
tain little value to Bolger at the end of the lease terms. Arguably there were
no economic underpinnings to the transaction; it constituted a pure tax
avoidance maneuver. Bolger probably never really intended to be the bona
fide owner of the building. The court, nonetheless, held for the taxpayer.43
One commentator has cited the Bolger case as an example of misuse of the
Code.44 Ironically, the principal culprit was the Internal Revenue Service,
35. Id. at 353-55.
36. 59 T.C. 760 (1973); see Lurie, supra note 24, at 355.
37. I.R.C. § 167 (1963) (current version at I.R.C. § 167 (West Supp. 1987)), the applica-
ble section at the time, allowed such deductions for real estate investments.
38. See Lurie, supra note 24, at 355, 356 (summarizes Bolger facts).
39. Id. at 370.
40. The manner in which the transfer was made is unclear.
41. Bolger capitalized the corporation with $1,000.
42. See Lurie, supra note 24, at 369-70.
43. Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 771 (1973).
44. See Lurie, supra note 24, at 358-60 (taxpayer should have investment in property and
suffer economic loss with property's depreciation before being allowed depreciation
deductions).
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which defeated itself by stipulation. Given Bolger's lack of any current or
future economic interest in the property and the other facts described above,
the burden and benefits of ownership were with the lessees. They, not
Bolger, effectively owned the property. Bolger and his corporations consti-
tuted little more than financing intermediaries. Other cases have held simi-
lar lessees to be the owners. 45 Unfortunately, the Internal Revenue Service
neglected to argue this point. Incredibly, the Commissioner conceded the
validity of the leases and did not argue that the lessees possessed the depre-
ciable interest. Instead, the Internal Revenue Service conceded that Bolger's
corporation did hold a depreciable interest, but maintained that the interest
was not transferred to Bolger. The IRS creatively argued that Bolger only
received a reversionary interest in the building and not a present interest
subject to depreciation. The IRS premised its position on the long-term na-
ture of the leases and mortgages and the fact that the parties consummated
leases and mortgages before the buildings were transferred to Bolger.
The majority of the Tax Court decided the case in this context. 46 Focus-
ing on the form of the transactions, the court held that the leases were trans-
ferred to the lenders solely as security and that each lease constituted "part
and parcel of the ownership of the particular property the legal and benefi-
cial ownership of which was vested at the outset in the appropriate corpora-
tion."' 47 In addition, the court did not question that under the appropriate
state law the corporations had made valid, present transfers to Bolger. 48 Ac-
cordingly, and somewhat summarily, the court rejected the IRS's view.49 It
further held that the indebtedness did not exceed the fair market value of the
collateral and was not contingent.50 Under Crane, therefore, the court
found the debt includible in basis.5 1
The Internal Revenue Service belatedly argued that Crane should not ap-
ply since little likelihood existed of Bolger ever developing any equity inter-
est in the property.5 2 The court also rejected this argument, positing,
somewhat fancifully, that equity would develop as the rents were paid, and
that the taxpayer would also seek to protect his interest in order to obtain
any benefits of appreciation.5 3 If the leases were not for terms apparently
approaching the useful lives of the building, it might have been possible for
equity to develop and the potential for appreciation to exist. The long term
nature of the leases made either event unlikely. The case, however, did not
center around this issue. Had the IRS coupled this latter point with an argu-
45. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 576-84 (1978); Helvering v. F. &
R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1939); Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258,
263-69 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); see also Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B.
715, 715-16.
46. Bolger, 59 T.C. at 766-68.
47. Id. at 768.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 768-69.
50. Id. at 769.
51. Id. at 770.




ment that the lessees were the true owners, the court might have reached a
different result. As it was, the court noted that "the combination of the
benefits of accelerated depreciation and the Crane doctrine produces a bitter
pill for respondent to swallow. We see no way of sugarcoating that pill,
short of overruling Crane v. Commissioner ... which we are not at liberty to
do."
5 4
Given the premises from which it began, the court's conclusions were
probably inevitable. No authority exists to deny to an original purchaser
depreciable basis in this context. Since the IRS acknowledged the validity of
the leases, the only logical recipient of the depreciable basis became Bolger
when the property was transferred to him. Courts should not interpret
Bolger as authority, in following Crane, to permit taxpayers to manipulate
the Tax Code and ignore the substance and economics of a transaction, but
rather as a case in which curious stipulations led to a curious result. Indeed,
Bolger has not unduly constrained the judicial system. 5
D. The Counterattack
Fortified in part by Mayerson and Bolger, the shelter industry went to
work in earnest. Promoters convinced often unwitting taxpayers that they
could receive huge "tax write offs" with minimal investment.56 Crane
notwithstanding, the courts and the IRS responded with a variety of meth-
ods to thwart the efforts of taxpayers to excessively inflate basis with liabili-
ties of often dubious authenticity.
1. Fair Market Value Requirement
One such response has required that the nonrecourse debt not exceed the
property's fair market value. A seminal case in this regard is Franklin v.
Commissioner.-7 In Franklin a California limited partnership, "Associates,"
purchased an Arizona motel for a purported purchase price of $1,224,000.
The purchasers were to pay for the property over ten years. Associates paid
the sellers, the Romneys, $75,000 in prepaid interest at the outset and gave
them an interest bearing, nonrecourse promissory note for the amount of the
54. Id. at 771.
55. See Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1976) (depreciation
predicated on investment in property, not on ownership); Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co.
v. United States, 505 F.2d 1266, 1269-70 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (taxpayers cannot include in basis
liabilities of highly contingent nature); Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 42
T.C. 834, 849 (1964) (since petitioner did not assume payment of mortgage, petitioner should
not include mortgage in basis), aff'dper curiam, 358 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
827 (1966); Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831, 839 (1963) (taxpayer may
not increase basis for contingent liabilities), aff'd per curiam, 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964).
56. See generally Gibson Prods. Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981)
(when parties agreed that lender might participate in venture and share in loan proceeds and
borrower's debt was nonrecourse, parties did not create true loan); Franklin v. Commissioner,
544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1976) (although bona fide debt allows absence of personal liabil-
ity, such debt is not bona fide if it is contingent on substantial appreciation of property directly
before repayment); Boom in Tax Shelters Artificially Lifts Prices of Much Real Estate, Wall St.
J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
57. 64 T.C. 752 (1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
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purchase price. The bulk of the principal of the note became due as a bal-
loon payment at the end of the ten-year term. Title was not to be transferred
to the purchasers until they had paid the purchase price in full. 58 Associates
subsequently leased the motel back to the Romneys by a lease that gave the
Romneys all material rights of ownership. 59 The rental amount approxi-
mately equaled the payments due on the note, and the rental period was co-
terminus with the term of the note.
Since the debt was nonrecourse, and since the lease was structured so as to
pay Associates' obligation on that debt, Associates' only exposure was the
$75,000 it originally invested, which it maintained was deductible interest.
Associates, however, claimed a depreciable basis of $1,224,000, the amount
of the note.60 The Tax Court, unburdened by the stipulations in Bolger, took
a rather different approach. It concluded that, given the payment and lease
terms, a sale had not even occurred because the sellers had not parted with
the benefits and burdens of ownership. 6 1 It held that Associates had merely
obtained an option to acquire the motel in the future.62
The Ninth Circuit, while also holding against the taxpayer, rejected the
Tax Court's position, maintaining that it was possible, even under the excep-
tional circumstances of the case, for a bona fide sale to have taken place. 63
The appellate court emphasized that the cornerstone of the analysis was
whether Associates had made an investment in the property.64 To prove
such an investment, it became necessary for Associates to show that the
purchase price appeared approximately equal to the fair market value of the
property. 65 Associates failed in this regard, and accordingly the court did
not allow it to include any amount of the note in basis. 66 The court reasoned
that:
An acquisition such as that of Associates if at a price approximately
equal to the fair market value of the property under ordinary circum-
58. The parties placed the warranty deed in an escrow account, along with a quit claim
deed from Associates to the Romneys, both of which would be delivered to Associates on full
payment of the purchase price, or to the Romneys on default.
59. The Romneys stood responsible for all the typical expenses of owning the motel prop-
erty, including all utility costs, taxes, assessments, rents, charges, levies of "every name, nature
and kind whatsoever," and payments on the first and second mortgages. They could also fur-
ther encumber the property without the consent of Associates and could propose new capital
improvements that Associates would be required to either build themselves or allow the
Romneys to construct with compensating modification of the purchase price. Franklin, 544
F.2d at 1047.
60. At the time the case arose in 1968, Congress had not yet enacted the at risk rules of
I.R.C. § 465. Congress enacted the first at risk rules to be effective for taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1978. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 204(a), 92 Stat. 2763,
2817 (1978) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 465 (West Supp. 1987)). Even if the rules had
been in effect, the taxpayers might have fallen within the real estate exception. See infra notes
105-147.
61. Franklin, 64 T.C. at 761-62.
62. Id. at 761-71.
63. Franklin, 544 F.2d at 1047 (citing Hudspeth v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 1224, 1227
(9th Cir. 1976)).





stances would rather quickly yield an equity in the property which the
purchaser could not prudently abandon. This is the stuff of substance.
It meshes with the form of the transaction and constitutes a sale.
No such meshing occurs when the purchase price exceeds a demon-
strably reasonable estimate of the fair market value. Payments on the
principal of the purchase price yield no equity so long as the unpaid
balance of the purchase price exceeds the then existing fair market
value .... [T]he purchaser by abandoning the transaction can lose no
more than a mere chance to acquire an equity in the future .... 67
Fresh from its victory in the Ninth Circuit, the Service issued a series of
revenue rulings involving the film industry,68 patents, 69 lithographic
plates,70 and domestic exhibition rights.71 In each revenue ruling the tax-
payers attempted to dramatically inflate basis with nonrecourse debt of a
decidedly specious variety. Following Franklin's lead, the Service denied a
basis increase for the purported debt obligation given the taxpayer's inability
to prove the property's fair market value. 72
2. Excessive Contingencies
Regardless of a property's fair market value, courts also have refused to
include liabilities in basis if they are so contingent that the likelihood of
payment is seriously called into question. Courts have found liabilities ex-
cessively contingent when the liabilities involved: an obligation to repay an
advance out of speculative revenues generated over a limited period; 73 uncer-
tain liabilities that might arise out of a pending lawsuit;74 a modified agree-
ment to fulfill the undeterminable severance pay obligations of a predecessor
company; 75 a note to be repaid solely from profits from the sale of ocean
front properties, if and when created by a dredging operation;76 and nonre-
course notes secured by a license for a computer assisted translation system
and the speculative proceeds to be obtained from the system.
77
The issue of the contingency of payments can also arise when the long
term value of the collateral is too ephemeral to support the existence of non-
67. Id. at 1048. The court also denied the taxpayer a deduction for the prepaid interest
because the debt did not have economic significance. Associates, therefore, had not secured
"the use or forbearance of money." Id. at 1049 (quoting Norton v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d
608, 610 (9th Cir. 1973)).
68. Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58.
69. Rev. Rul. 78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62.
70. Rev. Rul. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. 289.
71. Rev. Rul. 80-42, 1980-1 C.B. 182.
72. Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. at 59; Rev. Rul. 78-29, 1978-1 C.B. at 62-63; Rev. Rul.
79-432, 1979-2 C.B. at 291-92; Rev. Rul. 80-42, 1980-1 C.B. at 183.
73. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1266, 1269-70 (Ct. Cl.
1974).
74. Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 834, 846-50 (1964), aff'd
per curiam, 358 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 827 (1966).
75. Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831, 839-41 (1963), aff'd per
curiam, 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964).
76. Graf v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 944, 945-47 (1983).
77. Driggs v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 759, 775-76 (1986).
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recourse debt. This issue arises readily with oil and gas activities. 78 An oft
cited case in this regard is Gibson Products Co. v. United States.79 Gibson
Products Company invested in the "McNiel Street" oil and gas limited part-
nership. McNeil Street in turn entered into a joint venture with another
limited partnership. The joint venture acquired five oil and gas leases from
Galaxy Oil Company (Galaxy). Galaxy agreed to drill exploratory wells on
each of the five leases. The joint venture paid Galaxy approximately sixty
percent of the drilling costs with a nonrecourse, interest bearing promissory
note. The leases, the operating equipment, and eighty percent of the oil and
gas to be produced secured the note. Galaxy also possessed an option to
acquire a twenty percent joint venture interest in the wells. The joint ventur-
ers, pursuant to section 752 of the Code, included in their bases in the joint
venture their shares of the nonrecourse note.80 McNeil Street's share of the
liability was in turn passed down to its partners, including Gibson Products
Company. The partners included the liability in their bases in their partner-
ship interests. 81 This additional basis permitted the partners to take substan-
tial intangible drilling costs deductions. 82
The court held that the nonrecourse note to Galaxy did not constitute a
legitimate debt because the combined assets of both joint venturers were not
sufficient to pay the note absent production from the oil and gas leases. 83
In a true lending transaction, the borrower normally possesses assets
nearly equal or greater in value than the amount of indebtedness...
[and] there exists the reasonable likelihood that the lender will be repaid
in light of all reasonably foreseeable risks ... [and] that the ability of
the borrower will not be wholly or substantially contingent upon the
success or failure of the business venture. 84
The court acknowledged that the leases and drilling contracts initially pos-
sessed value and thus might have constituted legitimate collateral for the
note.85 The Court took the position, however, that the value of the drilling
contracts and leases appeared too transitory to be considered proper secur-
ity.86 If drilling failed, not only the value of the drilling contracts, but the
leases themselves might go to zero. An oil and gas property only has worth if
oil and gas is present. In this regard the court insisted:
78. See Fielder, supra note 19, at 527, 536-38, 556 (author questions whether ostensible
loans that were only to be repaid if the borrower discovered oil and gas and achieved produc-
tion really possessed enough characteristics of true loan to qualify as one).
79. 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981).
80. Id. at 1043-44; see I.R.C. § 752 (1982).
81. See I.R.C. § 752 (1982).
82. Section 263(c) provides an option by which taxpayers may elect to expense intangible
drilling and development costs. Id. § 263(c) (West Supp. 1987). Section 704(d) limits a part-
ner's loss deductions to his partnership interest basis. Id. § 704(d) (1982).
83. Gibson Prods. Co., 637 F.2d at 1047; cf Brountas v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 491, 568-
71 (1979) (nonrecourse notes constituted legitimate debt under § 636 and thus were fully in-
cludable in basis of partner's partnership interest, despite notes' contingent nature).
84. Gibson Prods. Co., 637 F.2d at 1047 (quoting Fielder, supra note 19, at 534).
85. Id. at 1048.
86. Id. "It is self-evident that the enhancement value of an exploratory drilling contract
will change when the well is completed, after which the value of [a lease interest in a] mineral
property will either soar or plummet depending upon the results of the drilling." Id.
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In a true loan it is contemplated that the borrower will maintain assets
equal or greater in value than the amount of the debt. [Cases upholding
the existence of nonrecourse debt involved] ... real and personal prop-
erty of a durable nature which (1) possessed "an objectively ascertain-
able present value, at least equal to the amount of the indebtedness
along with a reasonably predictable future value ... reasonably certain
to remain at least equal to the amount of the indebtedness and (2) was
relatively immune to or which might be insured against sudden devel-
opments [that] might reduce the value of the property below the
amount of unpaid indebtedness.
87
The court pointed out that another characteristic of a loan is that it entitles a
borrower to all the entrepreneurial rewards. 88 The court felt that Galaxy's
right to a twenty percent share of profits conflicted with this principle.8
9
Accordingly, the court held that the nonrecourse note did not possess
enough of the characteristics of a true loan to be treated as one, and the
putative debtors could not include the liability in basis. 90
Gibson, therefore, adds the additional requirement that, in the case of non-
recourse debt, the collateral's value not be susceptible to quick evaporation.
In emphasizing the transitory value of the partnership's assets, the court
raises the question of whether it is possible for nonrecourse debt to be ac-
ceptable if the security consists of mineral interests. The value of the interest
is usually almost wholly contingent on the existence of the mineral, assum-
ing no associated surface rights exist. The possibility will always exist that
the value of the interest would collapse if there were a failure to discover the
mineral. Outside the mineral industry the problem is less likely to arise since
the durability of the collateral's value is typically more substantial. As
banks who made loans to farmers in the midwest and to real estate buyers in
Colorado and Houston are now sadly aware, however, real estate values can
collapse too.9 1 Further, it seems inequitable to single out the mineral indus-
try for adverse treatment. No congressional, or widespread judicial, support
exists for such a position. When dealing with properties that have an inher-
ently speculative value, the focus might be best moved away from considera-
tions of the fair market value of the collateral to whether, given all the facts,
it is likely the obligation will be paid. In the case of wildcat wells involved in
Gibson, risk of nonpayment may well have been too great to permit the basis
inclusion. Dillingham v. United States92 demonstrates that this problem
need not always exist. In Dillingham Basin Petroleum Corporation (Basin)
was engaged in oil and gas exploration as well as contract drilling. In order
to raise working capital, Basin offered limited partnership interests to third
87. Id. at 1048-49 (quoting Fielder, supra note 19, at 537) (emphasis in original).
88. Id. at 1048.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1049.
91. See Belongia, Factors Behind the Rise and Fall of Farmland Prices. A Preliminary
Assessment, 67 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis REV., Aug.-Sept. 1985, at 18; see also
Hooper, City Review, Houston, NAT'L REAL ESTATE INV., June 1985, at 185 (discussing trou-
bles in Houston, Texas); Wilkinson, City Review, Denver, NAT'L REAL ESTATE INV., Sept.
1986, at 115 (discussing troubles in Denver, Colorado).
92. 1981-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9601 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
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parties in a large number of low risk, presumably developmental, pros-
pects. 9 3 The limited partnership interests were financed in part by nonre-
course loans from Basin.94  Revenues from successfully drilled wells
effectively secured the loans just as they did in Gibson. The court nonethe-
less held that nonrecourse loans were bona fide and includable in basis.95
Although it acknowledged that one might consider such loans contingent in
some cases, the court concluded that the high percentage of low risk proper-
ties provided sufficient certainty that the loans would be repaid. 96 The court
distinguished Gibson on the grounds that the properties in Gibson, and im-
plicitly the potential for revenues, were "purely speculative."'97
E. Shams
Of course, the rules for including liabilities in basis assume the debt is not
a work of pure fiction. Circumstances may arise such that the alleged debt
simply constitutes an artifice to create large tax benefits out of whole cloth.
There may be no genuine intent to fulfill the obligation. The courts and the
Service have understandably rejected the use of such nominal debt
instruments. 98
II. AT RISK RULES
A. General Principles
As discussed above, nonrecourse debt can inflate basis without personal
exposure, and the incentive to use such debt has often proved irresistible.
Taxpayers have structured transactions to yield a profitable return, not
through their underlying economics, but rather through the tax benefits gen-
erated. 99 Taxpayers in a high tax bracket' ° ° potentially could earn a profit
based on the depreciation deductions and investment tax credits alone.' 0,
Not all these efforts were ended successfully. The courts prevented excessive
93. Developmental wells are drilled in areas with known production and therefore involve
less risk. See J. LOWE, OIL AND GAS IN A NUTSHELL 295 (1983). Exploratory wells (such as
those involved in Gibson) are drilled in areas without production, and involve greater risk. Id.
94. I.R.C. § 465 (West Supp. 1987) would now affect this method. See infra notes 105-147
and accompanying text.
95. Dillingham, 1981-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9601. The transactions arose in 1971 and 1972
prior to the enactment of the at risk rules of section 465, which would have affected deduc-
tions. See infra notes 105-147 and accompanying text.
96. Dillingham, 1981-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9601.
97. Id.
98. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960) (transaction between taxpayer
and insurance company did not create indebtedness); Beck v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1534,
1564 (1980) (parties never paid for property, but engaged in check swapping; since financial
resources never required, purchase scheme and deduction illusory); Golsen v. Commissioner,
54 T.C. 742, 753 (1970) (purported loans lacked economic substance; "interest" payments
merely insurance premiums),
99. Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 769 (1973).
100. Before 1982 taxpayers in a high tax bracket were taxed seventy percent of their taxa-
ble income. I.R.C. § 1 (1981) (current individual tax rates at I.R.C. § I (West Supp. 1987)).
101. Id.; Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386, 405 (1987) (tax credits and deductions, not
profit objective, motivated petitioners to acquire Picasso packages).
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uses of nonrecourse debt. 10 2 Taxpayers, however, could still legitimately
structure transactions so as to allow themselves substantial basis and associ-
ated tax benefits through the use of nonrecourse debt without risking finan-
cial exposure. 10 3 These transactions often conflicted with the principle that
a taxpayer's basis in a property represents his investment.' 4 Investment
implies economic risk, or at least a concern for the economics and not just
the tax aspects of a transaction.
Congress felt that the best remedy to this problem was not through the
often ad hoc approach of the courts, but rather through the presumedly reli-
able and systematic approach of statute. 10 5 The result came in the form of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976's enactment of the at risk rules of section
465.106 The at risk rules disallow otherwise permissible deductions to the
extent the taxpayer is not "at risk" on his investment. 10 7 In the case of debt
the at risk rules require personal exposure, thereby usually orphaning nonre-
course liabilities. 10 8
Initially the rules appeared far from prophylactic. They only applied to
losses from movies, farming, leasing of personal property, and oil and gas
activities. 1 9 The rules did not apply to corporations, other than personal
holding companies and Subchapter S corporations. 1"0 In the case of partner-
ships they applied at the partner level."'
Congress apparently felt that the 1976 Act had not sufficiently suppressed
the innovative instincts of tax shelter promoters. As a result, in the Revenue
Act of 1978 Congress extended the application of section 465 to all types of
investments, except equipment leasing by certain closely held corporations
and investments in real estate. 1 2 Congress enlarged the risk rules to cover
the investment tax credit produced by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981.113 The Tax Reform Act of 1984 made relatively taxpayer friendly
changes. 114 The 1984 Act exempted active businesses of certain closely held
102. See supra notes 57-67, 79-90 and accompanying text.
103. Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. at 760; Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340
(1966); Dillingham v. United States, 1981-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9601 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
104. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
105. I.R.C. § 465 (1977) (current version at I.R.C. § 465 (West Supp. 1987)); see SENATE
COMM. ON FINANCE, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3439, 3482-83 (at risk rule will
remedy abuses under Crane).
106. I.R.C. § 465(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1987); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
455, § 204(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1531 (1976) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 465 (West Supp.
1987)).
107. I.R.C. § 465(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
108. Id. § 465(b).
109. Id. § 465(c).
110. Id. § 465(a)(1).
111. Id. § 465(c).
112. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of I.R.C.).
113. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
114. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
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C corporations from the at risk rules."15
The exception for real estate survived all the amendments, based in part
on the long standing use of nonrecourse debt in real property transactions.
This exception and the availability of accelerated depreciation, which per-
mits disproportionately large deductions in the early years of a property's
life, caused the formation of many real estate tax shelters. The shelters were
usually highly leveraged with nonrecourse debt.' 1 6 Many office buildings in
Denver and Houston stand vacant in tribute to these tax benefits.' 17
In response to these often overzealous tax shelter programs, Congress
brought real estate's exalted status to an end in the full court press that
constituted the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 18 The 1986 Act eliminated accel-
erated depreciation for real estate.l" 9 Taxpayers must now use straight line
depreciation, which is a depreciation method that requires equal deprecia-
tion deductions over a fixed number of years. 1 20 The 1986 Act lengthened
the depreciation terms to 27.5 years for residential real estate and 31.5 years
for commercial real estate.' 2 1 Previously the period ran 19 years for all de-
preciable real property. 122  The change of the depreciation method to
straight line and the lengthening of the depreciation periods dramatically
reduces the deductions available from real estate and, along with it, the in-
terest in real estate tax shelters.' 23 Congress, however, left no stone un-
turned. Congress also brought real estate within the ambit of the at risk
rules, albeit with a statutory escape hatch. 124 This Article discusses this de-
velopment in more detail below.
Deductions for losses from section 465 activities are limited to the tax-
115. The C corporation may not be a-personal holding company, I.R.C. § 545 (West Supp.
1987), a foreign personal holding company, id. § 552(a), or a personal service company, id.
§ 269A. A corporation qualifies as a personal service corporation if its principal activity is the
performance of personal services and an "employee-owner" performs those services. Id.
§ 269A(b)(1). Normally, an employee-owner is any employee who on any day during the tax
year owns more than 10% of the outstanding stock of the personal service corporation. For
purposes of the closely held C corporation exception to the at risk rules, however, that thresh-
old decreases to 5%. Id. § 465(c)(7)(B)(iii). To qualify as a personal service company, five or
fewer people must own one-half of the stock, by value. Id. § 542(a)(2).
116. See Real-Estate Tax Shelters Booming, But Critics Move to Trim Benefits, Wall St. J.,
July 5, 1983, at 25, col. 3.
117. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
118. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of I.R.C.).
119. Compare I.R.C. § 168(b)(2), (c) (West Supp. 1987) with id. § 168(b)(3).
120. B. BITTKER, supra note 14, 10.8(1).
121. I.R.C. § 168(c) (West Supp. 1987).
122. Id. § 168(b)(2). The taxpayer, at its option, could lengthen the 19-year period up to
45 years and use straight line depreciation. Id. § 168(b)(3).
123. Commerical real property acquired on January 1, 1986, with $100,000 of depreciable
basis receives depreciation deductions of $8,800 in the first year, $8,100 in the second year, and
$7,300 in the third year, for a total of $24,200. Id. § 168(b)(2). If that same property is
acquired on January 1, 1987, the depreciation deduction will amount to approximately $3,175
per year, for a total over the three years of $9,525, less than half the amount available under
the prior system. Id. § 168(b)(3), (c).
124. Id. § 465(b)(6) (taxpayer at risk for his share of qualified nonrecourse financing se-
cured by real property).
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payer's "amount at risk."' 12 5 A taxpayer is at risk in an activity to the extent
of the amount of money and adjusted basis of property contributed to the
activity. 126 More importantly, the amount at risk also includes sums bor-
rowed for use in the activity on which the taxpayer is personally liable. 127
Even if the liability technically appears recourse, the Code will not consider
a taxpayer at risk if he is in any way protected against loss through guaran-
tees, stop losses, or similar devices. 12 8 Courts have often included the ability
to convert a recourse note into a nonrecourse obligation as such a protection
against risk. 129
Although a direct exception to section 465 for real estate activities no
longer exists, there is an indirect one. "Qualified nonrecourse financing" is
included in the amount at risk.130 Taxpayers, therefore, can still acquire real
estate with nonrecourse debt without running afoul of the at risk rules. To
constitute qualified nonrecourse financing the loan must be nonrecourse,
and the taxpayer must borrow "with respect to the activity of holding real
property."' 3 1 A "qualified person," generally a governmental entity or a
commercial lender not related to the taxpayer, must also make the loan,
which may not be convertible. 132 While one can question whether real estate
should receive preferential treatment, the use of excessive amounts of nonre-
course debt caused the concerns. The new rules should bring this abuse to a
halt. The provisions require nonrecourse real estate loans to meet normal
commercial standards. Commercial lenders generally will not make nonre-
125. Id. § 465(a).
126. Id. § 465(b)(1)(A). A contribution of encumbered property increases the amount at
risk by the property's adjusted basis, if the taxpayer is personally liable on the debt, and by the
adjusted basis less liabilities, if the taxpayer is not personally liable. If in the latter case, the
liabilities exceed the basis, the amount at risk is reduced. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-2(a), 44
Fed. Reg. 32,237 (1979).
127. I.R.C. § 465(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
128. Id. § 465(b)(4); see also Capek v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 14, 49-54 (1986) (alleged
loans protected through stop loss within meaning of I.R.C. § 465(b)(4) (West Supp. 1987);
Rev. Rul. 85-113, 1985-2 C.B. 150, 150 (transfer of property derived from activity without
additional exposure could satisfy recourse note); Rev. Rul. 83-133, 1983-2 C.B. 15, 16 (scheme
identical to Rev. Rul. 85-113); Rev. Rul. 82-123, 1982-1 C.B. 82, 83 (no personal liability if
Service finds tax benefits unavailable); Rev. Rul. 80-72, 1980-1 C.B. 110, 110-11 (taxpayer not
at risk with respect to proceeds from sale of option); Rev. Rul. 78-413, 1978-2 C.B. 167, 167-68
(taxpayer protected from loss by offsetting liabilities).
129. Porreca v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 821, 839-40 (1986) (since taxpayers could convert
promissory note to nonrecourse liabilities, they were not at risk); Rev. Rul. 82-225, 1982-2
C.B. 100, 101 (purpose of provision allowing taxpayer to convert note from recourse to nonre-
course was to increase amount at risk); Rev. Rul. 81-283, 1981-2 C.B. 115, 116 (since purpose
of option allowing investor to convert note into nonrecourse obligation was to increase inves-
tor's amount at risk and was not for business purposes, investors treated as at risk for amount
paid before conversion); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-5, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,238 (1979) (liabilities
that may convert from recourse to nonrecourse may still be at risk if primary motive is busi-
ness and such transaction is consistent with normal commercial practice). In Gefen v. Com-
missioner, 87 T.C. 1471, 1501 n.24 (1986), the court noted, but did not rule on this issue.
130. I.R.C. § 465(b)(6) (West Supp. 1987).
131. Id. § 465(b)(6)(B)(1).
132. Id. §§ 465(c)(8)(D)(iv), 465(b)(6)(D). The loan also qualifies if a federal, state, or
local governmental entity guarantees its. Id. § 465(b)(6)(B)(ii). The related party provision
will not apply if the loan is commercially reasonable and is on substantially the same terms as
loans involving unrelated persons. Id. § 465(b)(6)(D)(ii).
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course loans in excess of amounts that can be paid from the expected income
from the activity. In the future, therefore, nonrecourse real estate loans
should be limited to reasonable amounts.
The taxpayer who contributes cash also will be at risk, notwithstanding
that the taxpayer obtained the cash through a nonrecourse loan, provided
the lender is unrelated to the taxpayer, 133 and provided further the collateral
is not used in the activity.134 This exception appears sensible, since from the
perspective of the activity, only a contribution of cash is involved. The non-
recourse debt is between the taxpayer and an unrelated creditor. Except for
qualified nonrecourse financing and this latter exception, nonrecourse debt
will not increase the at risk amount.' 35
B. Loss Computations
One must recognize that the at risk provisions do not provide rules for the
computation of deductions or losses. 136 A taxpayer will compute the depre-
ciation and other available deductions from debt financed property by refer-
ence to his basis, which the taxpayer continues to compute by including both
recourse and nonrecourse liabilities. Subsequently, one must make a deter-
mination as to whether the at risk rules deny any portion of the deduc-
tion. 137 Taxpayers, therefore, determine the extent to which losses are
allowable under the basis rules. Section 465, inter alia, determines whether
the losses are currently deductible. The taxpayer may carry forward losses
that are not currently deductible due to the application of the at risk rules to
a future year when there exists a sufficient amount at risk. 138
Congress could have incorporated the at risk rules directly into the basis
rules and simply have denied basis for unsuitable debt. This solution, how-
ever, would have created the computational problems discussed earlier. 139
Instead, Congress created accounts in which taxpayers could deposit disal-
lowed deductions pending the development of a sufficient at risk amount. 140
C Recourse Debt
The indispensable requisite of the at risk rules, and the component that
has resulted in the most litigation, is the provision permitting a taxpayer's
share of recourse liabilities to increase his amount at risk. Tax shelters,
which are typically organized as limited partnerships, live or die based on
their ability to generate debts for which the partners will be considered to be
personally liable.'41 The object often has been to create nominally recourse
133. Id. § 465(b)(3)(A).
134. Id. § 465(b)(2)(B).
135. Id. § 465(b)(2).
136. Id. § 465(a).
137. Abramson v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 360, 375 (1986); Pritchett v. Commissioner, 86
T.C. 580, 595 (1985) (Whitaker, J., dissenting), rev'd, 827 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1987).
138. I.R.C. § 465(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
139. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
140. I.R.C. § 465(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
141. Two principal means exist to accomplish the typical objective of a tax shelter, that is,
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debt on which no payment is actually expected.142 The proposed regulations
under section 465 endeavor to limit the potential for this abuse. These regu-
lations provide, for example, that if a partnership incurs recourse debt, that
debt will only increase a partner's amount at risk if the partner is directly
liable to the third party creditor on the partnership loan. 143 Those parties
operate at an adequate distance from one another. Agreements between a
partner and a partnership are not always at arm's length. Under the pro-
posed regulations the amount at risk will not be increased if the partner is
merely obligating himself to make contributions to the partnership in the
future, whether it be under subscription agreements or under notes made to
the partnership, until the contribution is actually made. 144 This regulation is
defensible unless the partner's recourse obligation to the partnership is cou-
pled to and triggered by the partnership's recourse obligation to a third
party creditor. If properly transacted, the partner will, via the obligation to
make contributions, be effectively liable on the third party debt. In such
circumstances a court should consider the partner at risk for the amount of
his obligation. 145 Neither the courts nor the Service have always agreed
with this position, as is discussed in more detail below.
146
Section 465 contains a rather curious exclusion from the amount at risk
for sums borrowed from a person with an interest in the activity, or from
someone related to a person other than the taxpayer, with an interest in the
activity. 147 Presumably Congress added this provision to avoid fictitious
to generate deductions in excess of an investor's equity investment. The first method creates
deductions that require no cash outlays, for example, qualifying for the section 168 cost recov-
ery reductions. I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1987). Under the second method, often used in
conjunction with the first, the tax shelter incurs liabilities and then expends the proceeds to
generate deductions. While the taxpayer may have to repay recourse liabilities in a future year,
the taxpayer obtains deductions often exceeding its equity investment in the tax shelter's first
year. Intangible drilling costs incurred in drilling an oil and gas well exemplify a cash outlay
that generates significant first year deductions. Id. § 263(c).
142. See Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386, 415 (1987) (petitioners engaged in purchase
and sale of Picasso packages for primary purpose of obtaining tax deductions and credits).
143. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-24(a)(2), 44 Fed. Reg. 32,242 (1979).
144. Id. § 1.465-22(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 32,241. The amount at risk is increased only when the
contribution is made or an amount on the note is paid. Id. This proposal highlights the diffi-
culty in applying the at risk rules to achieve their intended purpose. Section 465 provides for
increases in the amount at risk to the extent of amounts borrowed with respect to the activity,
if the taxpayer is personally liable thereon. I.R.C. § 465 (West Supp. 1987). The case of a
recourse note contributed by a partner to a partnership arguably meets this requirement. On
the other hand, the basis in the note or obligation under a subscription agreement would be
zero. If the note is considered property contributed to the partnership, whether or not the
relevant partners would be at risk is immaterial to the allowance of a loss deduction; the failure
of the note to generate basis would bar a loss deduction. I.R.C. § 704(d) (1987).
145. See infra notes 153-196 and accompanying text.
146. Id.
147. I.R.C. § 465(b)(3) (West Supp. 1987). Except as provided in regulations, the House
Report indicates that the regulations should exempt from the at risk provisions arm's length
recourse loans by otherwise unrelated commercial lenders. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1510, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 697, 1150; see
also Waddell v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 848, 915 (1986) (borrowed amounts, even if recourse,
are not at risk in an activity if lender contains interest in activity other than as creditor);
Jackson v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 492, 530 (1986) (since investor owned 100% of stock of
corporation, no part of his recourse debt could be considered at risk).
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loans designed to artificially increase a partner's at risk amount. This ap-
proach appears unnecessarily encompassing. If loan proceeds are in fact to
be used in the activity, with appropriate safeguards, such loans should qual-
ify regardless of the source of the loans. No reason exists that a bona fide
loan could not exist between parties with interests in the activity. While, for
example, a general partner promoter might desire to increase his limited
partner's tax benefits when his own money is at stake and used in the activ-
ity, he presumably will exercise prudence.
D. Brand and Smith
A series of relatively recent cases has gone far to define, and occasionally
muddle, the scope of the at risk rules. In Brand v. Commissioner 148 the Tax
Court considered whether limited partners were at risk for the portion of a
partnership loan they guaranteed. The applicable state law allowed a guar-
antor reimbursement from the primary obligor for any amounts paid pursu-
ant to the guarantee. This law protected the limited partners against loss
since they could seek repayment from the general partner in the event they
had to fulfill the guarantees. Accordingly, the Tax Court held that the lim-
ited partners were not at risk. 149
The taxpayers were more successful in the somewhat convoluted case of
Smith v. Commissioner.'50 The case actually concerned the basis calcula-
tions, but has proved relevant in the at risk context. Smith was a partner in
a partnership that purchased a parcel of real estate and paid for it, in part,
with a nonrecourse promissory note. Smith later contributed an assumption
of liability agreement to the partnership, by which he assumed the partner-
ship's liability on the nonrecourse note. Apparently the parties completed
this transaction in connection with the departure of some partners and the
entry of others, and also to permit Smith to withdraw certain funds from the
partnership. Smith argued, and the court agreed, that his assumption of the
nonrecourse liability permitted him to increase his basis in his partnership
interest under section 752. 151 The decision is significant because the court
focused on Smith's ultimate liability for the debt in reaching its conclu-
sion. 152 If ultimate liability provides the cornerstone of the analysis in ascer-
taining basis, perhaps it can perform the same function in determining
whether a taxpayer is at risk.
E. Pritchett
The Tax Court's analysis deteriorated in Pritchett v. Commissioner. 15
The Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed the Tax Court in Pritchett. 154 The
148. 81 T.C. 821 (1983).
149. Id. at 828.
150. 84 T.C. 889 (1985).
151. Id. at 905-08.
152. Id. at 908.
153. 85 T.C. 580 (1985), rev'd, 827 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1987).
154. Pritchett, 827 F.2d at 644.
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lower court's ruling, however, raised important questions, and the author
will review the Tax Court's opinion in detail prior to a discussion of the
appellate court's decision. Pritchett involved five related limited partner-
ships organized to drill for oil and gas. Fairfield Drilling Corporation (Fair-
field), assigned oil and gas leases to each partnership in exchange for the
partnerships' agreement to pay Fairfield twenty percent of the gross sales
proceeds of the oil and gas extracted from the leased land.' 5 5 Concurrent
with the lease assignments, each partnership executed agreements with Fair-
field by which Fairfield agreed to drill and develop the properties on behalf
of the partnership. The partnerships paid Fairfield with cash and fifteen-
year recourse, noninterest bearing notes for these services. Only the general
partners stood directly and personally liable on the notes. Each of the lim-
ited partnership agreements, however, provided that in the event the note to
Fairfield was not paid in full at maturity, the limited partners would, upon
the call by the general partners, be personally obligated, on a pro rata basis,
to make additional capital contributions to the partnership to cover any defi-
ciency.' 56 The limited partners believed that they were obligated on the
Fairfield notes to the extent of their obligations to make pro rata capital
contributions. Accordingly, the limited partners argued that they stood per-
sonally liable for an amount borrowed with respect to the activity, as re-
quired by section 465, and therefore at risk. 1 57
The Tax Court disagreed and refused to permit linkage between the notes
and the limited partners' obligation to make additional capital contribu-
tions.' 5 In the court's view section 465 required fixed liability to qualify
under section 465, and the court considered the liability of the limited part-
ners to be contingent since it only arose if the general partners made a
call. '5 9 The taxpayers argued that their exposure was not contingent on the
discretion of the general partners, because under the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act a court can hold a limited partner liable to third parties for "the
difference between the contribution as actually made" and "any unpaid con-
tribution which he agreed ... to make in the future at the time and on the
conditions stated in the certificate."'160 Case law also permitted Fairfield to
proceed directly against the limited partners. 161 The court responded that at
155. The agreement provided for the 20% payment to be made after the partnership had
received a specific amount of net profits.
156. The case arose before the service proposed any regulations under I.R.C. § 465. Pro-
posed Regulation § 1.465-22(a) provides that agreements to make contributions to a partner-
ship do not increase the amount at risk. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-22(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 32,241
(1979). One may distinguish the regulations since the liability to a third party creditor triggers
the obligation to make the contributions. Fairfield would have been able to enforce the limited
partners' obligations to make contributions. See infra note 166 and accompanying text. Addi-
tionally, the regulations are proposed and therefore without legal effect.
157. Pritchett, 85 T.C. at 586; see I.R.C. § 465(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
158. Pritchett, 85 T.C. at 586-88.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 587 (emphasis in original) (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 15517(l)(a)-(b) (West
1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 88.180(1)(a)(b) (1979)).
161. Id. at 588-89. In support of their argument that limited partners may be directly
liable to a creditor, the taxpayers cited Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d 200 (9th Cir.
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the end of the fifteen-year term of the note, the obligation to make the contri-
bution might indeed become fixed. 162 For the tax years in question, however,
[The] requirement [to make a contribution] was merely a contingency
since it was not known in 1976 or 1977 (a) whether there would or
would not be sufficient partnership revenues to satisfy the Fairfield note
prior to or on maturity of the note, or in the event the Fairfield note was
not satisfied in full on maturity, the amount of the capital contributions
needed to cover the deficiency, or (b) if the general partners would in
fact exercise their discretion to make the cash call if an unpaid balance
on the Fairfield note were to exist on [the due date]. Hence, as of the
close of the taxable year in issue, petitioners had no current ascertain-
able liability to their partnerships for future contributions. 1 63
The court reasoned that even if one could view the limited partners as even-
tually possessing direct liability to Fairfield, "the 'at risk' inquiry ... is an
annual one," and no liability existed at the end of the taxable years in
question. 164
The majority opinion is misguided in a number of respects. First, the prin-
cipal motivation for enactment of the at risk rules was to deny taxpayers
deductions attributable to debts on which they are not personally liable. 165
The issue is not one of timing, as the court in Pritchett suggests, but rather
one of ultimate exposure. The facts clearly established that the limited part-
ners stood liable on their pro rata shares of the partnership's debt. Only the
general partners' call would trigger the obligation to pay the liability, but in
hanging its decision on that fragile peg the court prized form over substance.
No legitimate question existed that the general partners would do anything
other than require the limited partners to make their contributions should
partnership income be insufficient to pay the note. The partnership agree-
ments required the general partners to make the call. This situation consti-
tuted a business transaction, and few general partners would prefer to reach
into their own pockets rather than those of their limited partners. Further,
if the general partners had not made the cash call, Fairfield would have pos-
sessed the ability to proceed against the limited partners directly. 166 As the
1962); Linden v. Vogue Invs., Inc., 239 Cal. App. 2d 338, 48 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1966); Indiana
Mortgage & Realty Investors v. Spira-Mart, 115 Mich. App. 141, 320 N.W.2d 320 (1982).
162. Pritchett, 85 T.C. at 588-89.
163. Id. at 588 (footnotes omitted).
164. Id. at 589. The court noted that "[tihe 'at risk' inquiry for purposes of section 465 is
an annual one made on the basis of the facts existing at the end of each taxable year .... Id.
(citation omitted).
165. TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at
134, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4075, 4222-24; S. REP. No. 938,
94th Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 134, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4075,
4222-24; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 49, 86
[hereinafter Senate Report].
166. See Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d 200, 205 (9th Cir. 1962) (although part-
nership statutes generally do not bind limited partners upon partnership obligation to third
parties, general partner holds authority to conduct partnership business). The majority in
Pritchett recognized that a plaintiff could name the limited partners in a lawsuit brought
against the partnership debt when the limited partners are obligated to the partnership for
unpaid contributions. Pritchett, 85 T.C. at 587.
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court noted, the cash calls did not constitute amounts borrowed with respect
to the activity. 167 The notes themselves, however, did represent amounts
borrowed, and contrary to the holding of the majority, the limited partners
effectively possessed liability with respect to them. For one to defend the
decision, one would need to assume that the cash calls existed in a vacuum
and were of no real import, an assumption that would not be valid.
The fact that the general partners required no calls for contribution from
the limited partners for the years at issue is not determinative. 16  Section
465's annual determination is not one of actual payment, but rather one of
personal exposure. 169 A partner is at risk with regard to a partnership in-
debtedness if the partner appears personally obligated for its repayment, re-
gardless of when the partner must fulfil that personal obligation.'17  The
limited partners in Pritchett, therefore, remained at risk to the extent of their
liability for contributions. Under the reasoning adopted by the majority,
however, the limited partners could not have been at risk until the year in
which the call for contributions occurred. 7 1 If actual payment constituted
the critical criterion for at risk analysis, no need for the discussion of liabili-
ties in section 465 would exist. Once payment is made, the liability ends.
Instead of enacting section 465, Congress could have simply excluded liabili-
ties from basis altogether, but that did not represent Congress's intent.17 2
The cornerstone of at risk analysis remains personal liability, and such per-
sonal liability existed in Pritchett.
The Tax Court looked to state law to buttress its position. The court
noted that under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act a contributor's obli-
gation runs to the partnership, instead of the creditor, and is limited to the
conditions stated in the limited partnership certificate. 7 3 In Pritchett, the
general partners' call for contribution constituted the condition. 174 The
court's focus on state law is misplaced. Partners can be liable to third parties
to the extent of their obligation to make contributions. 75 Further, courts
have long held that federal law, not state law, controls tax issues. 17 6 Section
465 does not require the liability to run directly to the third-party creditor.
As in Smith, 177 the court should have focused on ultimate liability, not on
state procedural steps for enforcing the liability.
167. Pritchett, 85 T.C. at 586.
168. Id. at 587-89.
169. I.R.C. § 465(a) (West Supp. 1987) (flush language); see also Senate Report, supra note
165, at 48, 1976-3 C.B. at 86.
170. Cf. Abramson v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 360, 375-76 (1986) (since each partner's lia-
bility for partnership's debt ran directly to creditor, each partner presently stood at risk for his
proportional share).
171. Pritchett, 85 T.C. at 592.
172. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
173. Pritchett, 85 T.C. at 587-88.
174. Id. at 587.
175. Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d 200, 205 (9th Cir. 1962).
176. See generally Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161 (1942) (since Congress designed
federal revenue laws for national taxation scheme, these laws not subject to state laws unless
specifically permitted by Code section).
177. Pritchett, 84 T.C. at 908.
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If the limited partners were not at risk for their shares of the notes, no one
was. Under section 465 a taxpayer is not at risk to the extent he is entitled to
reimbursement for payment of a liability.178 The general partners were enti-
tled to reimbursement from the limited partners for any payment they might
make on the notes in an amount equal to the contributions the limited part-
ners were required to make. Since they therefore were protected them
against loss, the general partners were not at risk on that respective amount
of the debt. 179 If one accepts the court's reasoning, the limited partners were
not at risk on that portion either, and the result amounts to a full recourse
note, on most of which no party stood at risk. 180
The majority opinion also emphasized that the obligation of the limited
partners to make contributions would arise only upon the partnership's fail-
ure to generate sufficient revenues to pay the indebtedness. 18 1 Under this
approach it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for a court to find any-
one ever to be at risk. Typically, participants hope that revenues from an
activity will pay any liabilities incurred. Personal exposure is always to
some extent "contingent" on whether or not the activity is successful.
Under the analysis of Pritchett, that contingency would prevent participants
from being at risk. In addition, the Pritchett reasoning usually makes it
pointless to include liabilities in basis, since attributable deductions would
normally fail the at risk rules. A possibility almost always exists that the
activity's revenues will pay the debt. Congress intended that the at risk rules
suspend otherwise allowable deductions in certain limited circumstances,
182
not eliminate liabilities from the tax system. Focusing on the activity's po-
tential for generating payment of debt does not represent a sound method of
analyzing the applicability of the at risk rules.
Finally, the court failed to address the extent to which the limited partners
could include the liabilities in their bases. The court should have addressed
this issue before considering the at risk rules. As noted earlier, the Code
limits the deductions that a partner initially may take by that partner's basis
in the partnership.183 If sufficient basis exists, the partner then turns to the
at risk rules in order to ascertain whether they suspend otherwise allowable
deductions. ' 8 4
Before addressing this issue in the context of the Pritchett case, a brief
return to a general discussion of basis is necessary. Section 752 treats a part-
ner's share of partnership liabilities as a contribution of money by the part-
ner to the partnerhip.185 This treatment increases the partner's basis in the
178. Brand v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 821, 828 (1983).
179. I.R.C. § 465(b)(4) (West Supp. 1987).
180. Pritchett, 85 T.C. at 584 n.7.
181. Id. at 588.
182. See Senate Report, supra note 165, at 48-49, 1976-3 C.B. at 86-87.
183. See supra notes 11-30 and accompanying text; see also I.R.C. § 704(d) (1982) (part-
ner's share of partnership loss allowed only to extent of partner's adjusted basis in
partnership).
184. See Senate Report, supra note 165, at 48, 1976-3 C.B. at 86.
185. I.R.C. § 752(a) (1982).
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partnership interest. 186 The regulations determine a partner's share of re-
course liabilities based on the ratio that determines how partners share
losses.187 A limited partner's share of recourse liabilities, however, cannot
exceed the difference between contributions previously made and the contri-
butions that the partnership agreement requires the limited partner to make
in the future. 188 In the view of the regulations, therefore, limited partners
share losses for recourse debt via their obligation to make contributions. 189
They need not possess a direct contractual obligation to the creditor in order
to receive basis for their share of the recourse liabilities. 190 Partners are enti-
tled also to the basis increase regardless of whether their contributions or the
partnership revenues pay the liability. 191 Without question therefore, the
limited partners in Pritchett would have been entitled to an appropriate basis
increase if the partnership agreement automatically required them to make
contributions to the partnership.
The only issue remaining in Pritchett is whether the need for the general
partners to actually call on the limited partners for contribution so attenu-
ates that obligation that a court should ignore its existence. The answer
clearly is no. Partners typically do not make contributions until the general
partners request such contribution. Further, the Pritchett court indirectly
acknowledged that the general partners would make the call for contribution
if partnership proceeds appeared insufficient to pay the debt. 192 To deny the
basis increase simply because of a procedural step, which without doubt the
general partners would have taken, prizes form over substance and serves no
recognizable policy objective. Since the limited partners ultimately stood lia-
ble to the creditors, they should have received a basis increase.
Although the Pritchett court failed to address the basis issue, the court
implied that it would have denied a basis increase: "[T]he cash call, as pro-
vided for in the certificates of limited partnership [was] not an unpaid contri-
bution .... 193 As discussed above, an unpaid contribution must exist to
enable the limited partners to include a share of the recourse liabilities in
their partnership interest bases. 194 Under the court's reasoning, therefore,
the limited partners could not include the liabilities in their bases. Given
these circumstances, there probably existed no need for the court to address
the at risk issues. At risk rules become relevant only when one crosses the
basis threshold. 195 The lack of liabilities would have significantly reduced
the limited partners' bases, and lack of basis alone would presumably have
186. Id. § 722 (West Supp. 1987).
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Proesel v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 992, 1004 (1981).
191. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
192. 85 T.C. at 583 n.5.
193. Id. at 588.
194. See supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
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prohibited them from taking the losses. 196 Accordingly, given the court's
reasoning, it should have analyzed the case under the basis rules, not the at
risk rules. A proper analysis in both areas, however, should have resulted in
a basis increase for the limited partners and a finding that they were at risk
on the partnership debt.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision in Pritchett, often
citing the Tax Court's post-Pritchett holding in support of its decision. 197
The appellate court acknowledged that the limited partners were not directly
liable to Fairfield, 19 8 but rejected the Tax Court's contingency analysis, ob-
serving that under the partnership agreement the general partners were re-
quired to make the call for contributions, and the limited partners were
required to make the contributions. 199 In this regard the court noted the Tax
Court's decision in Melvin v. Commissioner,2° ° discussed below, 20 1 which
postdated Pritchett and in which the Tax Court held that a taxpayer stood at
risk on a debt if the taxpayer bore the ultimate economic responsibility for
the loan.20 2 The Ninth Circuit stated:
Applying the economic responsibility standard we have no reservation
in concluding that taxpayers, by virtue of their contractual obligations,
have ultimate responsibility for the debt .... Furthermore, we are not
dissuaded by the Tax Court's reasoning that the debt is contingent be-
cause the general partners may elect to not make the cash calls. The
contracts made the call mandatory and "economic reality" dictates that
the partners would do so. 203
Thus, unlike the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit recognized that general part-
ners would hardly pay the debt if they could obligate the limited partners to
do so.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the Tax Court's position that the liabilities
were contingent because it was not known in the tax year at issue whether
partnership revenues would be sufficient to satisfy the notes. 2°4 "If the notes
required balloon payments upon maturity, the limited partners' obligation to
contribute additional funds would be "certain." The acceleration of pay-
ments [via the use of partnership revenues] should not be a factor in the
taxation analysis. '20 5 The Ninth Circuit also reminded the lower court that
in Melvin 206 and in another post-Pritchett decision, Abramson v. Commis-
sioner,20 7 also discussed below, 20 8 the Tax Court had held that the taxpayers
196. I.R.C. § 704(d) (1982) (limits partner's distributive share of partnership loss to part-
ner's adjusted basis).
197. Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644, 646-47 (9th Cir. 1987).
198. Id. at 645 ("Only the general partners were personally liable under the notes.").
199. Id.
200. 88 T.C. 63 (1987).
201. See infra notes 243-50 and accompanying text.
202. Pritchett, 827 F.2d at 647 (citing Melvin v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. at 75).
203. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Melvin v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 63 (1987).
207. 86 T.C. 360 (1986).
208. See infra notes 219-42 and accompanying text.
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were at risk notwithstanding that in those cases partnership revenues also
might have paid the debt.20 9
Due to its contingency analysis, the Tax Court in Pritchett never resolved
the question of whether Fairfield held a noncreditor interest in the partner-
ship activity. If Fairfield held such an interest, section 465(b)(3)(B)(i) would
have precluded a determination that the taxpayers are at risk. Funds bor-
rowed from persons with noncreditor interests in the activity are excluded
from the amount at risk.210 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for con-
sideration of this issue. 21 1
The Ninth Circuit issued its decision after this Article was submitted for
publication. It was therefore gratifying to note that on appeal the Service
asserted an argument that involved a discussion of the present values of the
taxpayer's interest free obligations, 21 2 though not in the proper context.
This Article presents a present value analysis below. Under section
465(b)(4) a taxpayer is not considered at risk with respect to amounts that
are protected against loss by, inter alia, stop loss agreements, "or other simi-
lar arrangements. ' 2 13 The Commissioner argued that interest free notes
were a "similar arrangement. ' 2 14 The Service's position is not supported in
the statute or the legislative history. As the Ninth Circuit in Pritchett 2 15 and
the Tax Court in Melvin 2 16 discussed, economic exposure is the critical de-
termination under a section 465 analysis. The face amount of the notes rep-
resented that economic exposure, not their present value. The Service
should have instead focused on the taxpayers' bases, where the emphasis is
on economic investment, not economic risk. In this regard, as discussed be-
low, the present value of the notes is indeed an important consideration. 217
The Ninth Circuit remanded this latter argument of the Service for consider-
ation by the Tax Court as well, since the Service raised it for the first time on
appeal. 21'
F. Abramson and Melvin
The Tax Court appeared to reverse its field in Abramson v. Commis-
sioner.219 In Abramson a limited partnership (Surhill), acquired the rights to
a film possessing the provocative title of "Submission." Surhill paid the
purchase price of $1,750,000 with $225,000 in cash and a nonrecourse prom-
issory note in the amount of $1,525,000. Surhill secured this note with one-
half of the revenues it received from the film's distribution. In an effort to
come within the at risk rules, each partner also signed a guarantee agree-
209. Pritchett, 827 F.2d at 646-47.
210. I.R.C. § 465 (b)(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1987).
211. Pritchett, 827 F.2d at 648.
212. Id.
213. I.R.C. § 465(b)(4) (West Supp. 1987).
214. Pritchett, 827 F.2d at 647.
215. Id.
216. Melvin v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 63, 75 (1987).
217. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
218. Pritchett, 827 F.2d at 648.
219. 86 T.C. 360 (1986).
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ment, which provided that each limited and general partner would face per-
sonal liability for payment of a pro rata share of the note when it came
due.2 20 Although the note was nonrecourse, the lender still possessed re-
course against the limited and general partners through the guarantee
agreements.
The Abramson court initially noted that the transactions entered into did
not reflect those of a "typical abusive tax shelter" and that the taxpayers had
a "good-faith profit objective."' 22 1 The court proceeded to an analysis of ba-
sis, a step the Pritchett court failed to pursue.22 2 The court concluded that
the guarantee agreements effected an assumption of partnership liabilities,
increasing each limited partner's basis under sections 752 and 722.223 The
court referenced the ultimate liability focus of Smith in support of its
holding. 224
The Abramson court may have reached the right result in the basis analy-
sis, but it utilized the wrong approach to obtain that result. According to
the court, notwithstanding its liability discussion, the note in question was
nonrecourse. 22 5 If so, whether the limited partners possessed liability to the
lender was irrelevant for purposes of computing basis. Treasury Regulation
section 1.752-1(e) provides that all partners, including limited partners,
share nonrecourse liabilities in the same proportion as they share profits. 226
Personal exposure is not a factor.
On the other hand, personal exposure constitutes a factor in the case of
recourse liabilities, which are shared in accordance with the partner's ratio
for sharing losses. 227 Accordingly, the court should have only discussed the
personal liability of the limited partners in its basis analysis if the liability
220. The use of the term "guarantee" in this context is actually a misnomer. Guarantees
usually give the guarantor a right of contribution against the debtor whose obligation is being
guaranteed. Brand v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 821, 828 (1983). The difficulty of finding an
alternative title that would not take a paragraph to explain most likely is why the taxpayers
used the term "guarantee." Abramson v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 360, 366 n.10 (1986).
221. Abramson, 86 T.C. at 371-72.
222. See supra notes 183-196 and accompanying text.
223. Abramson, 86 T.C. at 374. The court noted that:
The guarantee of an otherwise nonrecourse note places each guaranteeing
partner in an economic position distinguishable from that of a general partner,
with liability under a recourse note-except that the guaranteeing partner's lia-
bility is limited to the amount guaranteed. While recognizing that under State
law there may be differences between the obligations of a general partner and
those of a limited partner guarantor, such differences should not be controlling
for Federal tax purposes .... In effect, the limited partners are the equivalent of
general partners to the extent of their pro rata guarantees especially since, as to
this obligation, the liability of the general partners is limited. Economic reality
dictates that they be treated equally, and we so hold. Consequently, both gen-
eral and limited partners will be entitled to include such liabilities in their basis
to the extent of their pro rata guarantees.
Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 365.
226. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1987).
227. See supra text accompanying note 187 (limited partner's share of recourse liabilities
cannot exceed future contributions that partnership agreement requires him to make). Treas.
Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
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was recourse. The court, however, specifically held that the liability was
nonrecourse. 228 The court's difficulty with this area demonstrates the com-
plexity of the Code and how even its most sophisticated handlers can experi-
ence difficulties.
The same end result does not necessarily occur. If the limited partner's
exposure makes the note recourse, as Judge Swift suggested in his concur-
ring opinion, 2 2 9 the regulation provides that the limited partners will receive
basis to the extent of their obligation to make future contributions to the
partnership. 230 The limited partners in Abramson apparently did not possess
an obligation to make such contributions. 23 1  If the note were recourse,
therefore, the limited partners would not have met the requirements of the
regulation and could not have included any part of the loan in their partner-
ship interest bases. Of course, this approach would also prize form over
substance, since permitting partners to include nonrecourse liabilities in ba-
sis, but denying partners basis for recourse debt on which they have per-
sonal, unprotected liability promotes absurdity.
The anomaly just discussed exists because the Service has not updated the
regulations promulgated under section 752 to take section 465 into account.
The Service drafted the regulations before the enactment of section 465, and
the regulations do not envision that the limited partners could stand directly
liable to a creditor. The regulations assume, rather, that any agreement
would only require that limited partners make additional contributions to
the partnership. Consequently, the regulations provide that the limited part-
ners share losses and accordingly receive basis increases attributable to re-
course liabilities to that extent.23 2 This assumption may have proved valid
once. The current Code requires a different approach. While an obligation
to make future contributions will permit a limited partner to include a share
of liabilities in basis, it will not increase the amount at risk.233 One way to
meet the at risk rules is to make the limited partners liable directly to the
lender on a pro rata share of the debt, hence the strategy used in Abramson.
The Service should update the section 752 regulations to take section 465
into account and permit limited partners to increase their bases in their part-
nership interests if they own unprotected liability on partnership debt to
partnership creditors. If the liability exists, any additional requirement that
the limited partners make contributions to the partnership is not necessary.
The limited partners sufficiently demonstrate their investment by the use of
the funds in partnership activities and their financial exposure.
After drawing its somewhat questionable conclusions as to basis, the Ab-
228. Abramson, 86 T.C. at 365.
229. Id. at 381.
230. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). This regulation states that, for purposes of comput-
ing basis, the limited partner's share of recourse liabilities cannot exceed the additional contri-
butions that the partnership agreement obligates him to make. Id.
231. If this fact existed in this case, one would assume the court would have taken express
notice.
232. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
233. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-22(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 32,241 (1979); see also supra note
144 and accompanying text (discusses limited partner's future contributions).
[Vol. 41
TAX BENEFITS OF LIABILITIES
ramson court, in four short paragraphs, resolved the at risk issue. 234 The
court emphasized that the critical concern questioned whether each limited
partner possesed "personal liability for payment from his personal as-
sets."' 235 The court found the limited partners to be at risk, since "each part-
ner agreed with the seller to be personally liable for a specific portion of the
debt".2 36 The court half-heartedly distinguished Pritchett on the grounds
that the limited partners in Pritchett were not directly liable to the lender on
the partnership obligation. 2 37
To distinguish Abramson and Pritchett on the grounds that in the former
the liability ran to the creditor and in the latter the liability ran to the gen-
eral partners not only prizes form over substance, but also misconstrues the
law. As previously noted, the section 752 regulations require that partners
have an obligation to make contributions to the partnership in order to in-
crease their basis in their partnership interests by their share in the partner-
ship recourse debt.238 Under the Abramson distinction, the basis and at risk
rules could come into conflict. If the obligation runs solely to the partner-
ship, the partner does not meet the at risk rules. 239 If the obligation runs
directly and exclusively to the creditor, section 752 will not give the taxpayer
basis. In either event, the taxpayer is denied consequent deductions because
he either will possess insufficient basis or will have failed to satisfy the at risk
rules.
Prudent taxpayers can solve this dilemma by making the limited partners
liable to both the partnership and the creditor. Congress, however, did not
intend sections 465 and 752 to become a procedural obstacle course for tax-
payers. The Service should amend the section 752 regulations as discussed
above. Courts should interpret section 465 in a manner consistent with the
underlying intent of Congress, which is to ensure that adequate financial
exposure exists before a taxpayer take deductions attributable to a liability.
Such exposure existed in Abramson, and the court appropriately considered
the taxpayers at risk. The financial exposure also existed in Pritchett, when
the court should have considered the taxpayers at risk.
In the context of its discussion of Pritchett, the Abramson court noted,
somewhat gratuitously, that the creditor in Abramson did not hold a part-
nership interest.2 40 A taxpayer does not include indebtedness to creditors
who have a partnership interest in the amount at risk.2 4 1 The court may
possibly have been implying that the creditor in Pritchett held such a prohib-
ited interest, since the applicable contract entitled the creditor to twenty
percent of gross sales.2 42 If so, defensible grounds exist to support the Tax
234. Abramson v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 360, 375-76 (1986).
235. Id. at 375.
236. Id. at 375-76.
237. Id.
238. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
239. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-22(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 32,241 (1979).
240. Abramson, 86 T.C. at 376.
241. I.R.C. § 465(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
242. Pritchett v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 580, 582 (1985), rev'd, 827 F.2d 644 (9th Cir.
1987). Judge Williams felt compelled to write a concurring opinion in Abramson that further
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Court's holding in Pritchett that the limited partners were not at risk and for
distinguishing Pritchett from Abramson. Unfortunately, the majority in
Pritchett did not base its decision on the lender's interest. Further, the dis-
cussion of this issue in Abramson appears too casual for one to consider it a
reformation of the Tax Court's conclusions in Pritchett.
The Tax Court followed the Abramson approach in the recent case of Mel-
vin v. Commissioner.243 In Melvin two brothers formed a general partner-
ship (MEDICI), which in turn became a limited partner in a motion picture
partnership (ACG). MEDICI contributed cash and a negotiable promissory
note to ACG in exchange for its limited partnership interest. ACG then
borrowed funds from a bank for a film purchase and gave the bank the
MEDICI promissory note as partial security. The note did not entitle the
brothers to reimbursement from the general partners, should they have had
to pay the notes. The issue litigated concerned whether ACG's grant of a
security interest in the note increased one of the brother's amount at risk.
The court held the taxpayer stood at risk to the extent of his pro rata
share of the bank loan. 244 The critical fact was the taxpayer's unprotected
liability on his note. 245 The court cited both Smith and Abramson in support
of its conclusion. 246 The court also held, contrary to its position in Pritchett,
that a taxpayer can be at risk notwithstanding the fact that the contributed
distinguished Pritchett. Abramson, 86 T.C. at 382 (Williams J., concurring). After repeating
the arguments of the majority, he took the position that even if one could treat the obligation
in Pritchett as an amount borrowed with respect to the activity, the liability still would fail the
§ 465 test. Id. In his view the limited partners' obligation ran to someone with an interest in
the activity, to wit, the general partners, which actually constituted the partnership itself. Id.
If Judge Williams's position were correct, partners could never meet the at risk rules and
simultaneously have basis. As mentioned above, the regulations require the limited partners to
be obligated to the partnership. See supra note 187-91 and accompanying text. As to whether
additional liability to the creditor directly would solve the problem, see supra notes 238-240
and accompanying text. Finally, the creditors in Pritchett most likely were third-party benefi-
ciaries of the agreement or the limited partners, and hence the limited partners were exposed
directly to the creditors as well, just as the limited partners were in Abramson. See supra note
161 and accompanying text.
243. 88 T.C. 63 (1987). The court also followed Abramson in Gefen v. Commissioner, 87
T.C. 1471 (1986). In Gefen a limited partnership borrowed funds to purchase computer equip-
ment, which the partnership then leased to Exxon Corporation. Each limited partner guaran-
teed a portion of the debt without any entitlement to reimbursement. The lender could
proceed directly against the limited partners or against the partnership. In the latter case each
limited partner was obligated to contribute to the partnership the amount of the debt that he
guaranteed. The court held that the pro rata share of the loan increased each limited partner's
basis and that each limited partner was at risk as to that amount. Id. at 1499-1504. The court
rejected the Service's argument that Exxon's strong credit rating meant that Exxon was un-
likely to default on its lease obligations, thereby protecting the limited partners against loss
and preventing them from being at risk. Id. at 1503. The court noted that the legislative
history to § 465 did not require taxpayers to enter into transactions with poor credit risks. Id.
A Lloyd's of London policy insuring the residual value of the computer equipment did not
affect the court's analysis, since it did not pertain to the years in question. Id. The court made
no reference to Pritchett. Id. at 1499-1504.
244. Melvin v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 63, 70-73 (1987).
245. Id. at 75. The court noted that "[the at risk rules are met] if [the taxpayer) has the
ultimate liability to repay the debt obligation of the partnership in the event funds from the
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note was payable in future years. 24 7
Although the court attempted to distinguish Pritchett, the analysis utilized
applies to the limited partners in Pritchett as well as those in Melvin.248 The
Pritchett limited partners also had ultimate liability. In the worst case scena-
rio, no partnership revenues would have existed, the general partners would
have made the call for contributions, and the limited partners would have
paid the debt. If ultimate liability is the focus, the obligations of the limited
partners in Pritchett appeared as definite and fixed as the obligations in Mel-
vin. The Pritchett court ignored the substance of the transaction, so prized
in Melvin.
The Melvin court noted the "non-arm's-length nature of the underlying
partnership loan" in Pritchett.24 9 One can read this brief reference to imply
that the loan was not genuine or perhaps that the creditor possessed an eq-
uity interest in the activity, which would prevent the taxpayer from includ-
ing the liability in the amount at risk.250 Again, if this interpretation
constitutes the Tax Court's intent, a justification exists for the Pritchett deci-
sion. The Pritchett court, however, did not rely on either point to support its
conclusion. Further, as in Abramson, the comments in Melvin in this regard
are too brief for one to conclude that the Tax Court has revised the Pritchett
holding.
A common denominator exists in the cases in which the Tax Court held
that the taxpayer satisfied the at risk rules; the creditor had held obligations
of the taxpayer. In Abramson the taxpayers and the creditor entered a guar-
antee agreement, and in Melvin the creditor held the taxpayer's note as col-
lateral. In Pritchett, on the other hand, the creditor held no undertakings
from the limited partners and principally stood as a third-party beneficiary
of the limited partners' obligation to make capital contributions to the part-
nership. To make at risk determinations based on the directness of the nexus
with the creditor, however, ignores the Melvin court's appropriate emphasis
on ultimate liability, substance, and the irrelevance of other parties in the
chain of liability who do not have actual exposure. As long as a taxpayer
possesses unprotected liability on a debt, the Service and the courts should
247. Id. at 76-77.
248. The Melvin court purportedly distinguished Pritchett because, in that case:
The alleged recourse debt obligations of the limited partners to make additional
cash contributions were not definite and fixed and were tainted by the non-
arm's-length nature of the underlying partnership loan. In the instant case, the
limited partners' obligations to make additional capital contributions to ACG
were definite and fixed ....
The relevant question is who, if anyone, will ultimately be obligated to pay
the partnership's recourse obligations if the partnership is unable to do so. ...
The scenario that controls is the worst-case scenario, not the best case. Further-
more, the fact that the partnership or other partners remain in the chain of
liability should not detract from the at-risk amount of the parties who do have
the ultimate liability. The critical inquiry should be who is the obligor of last
resort, and in determining who has the ultimate economic responsibility for the
loan, the substance of the transaction controls.
Id at 74-75 (footnotes and citations omitted).
249. Id. at 74.
250. I.R.C. § 465(b)(3) (West Supp. 1987); see supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
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consider the taxpayer at risk, regardless of the path the creditor must follow
to collect.
One can reasonably question whether Pritchett represents the Tax Court's
true position. Only seven of the sixteen voting judges agreed with the major-
ity holding.2 5 1 Two concurred that the limited partners were not at risk on
the completely independent grounds that the creditor held a prohibited eq-
uity interest. 252 Seven judges dissented. 25 3 Given a different fact pattern,
the concurring and nonvoting judges might feasibly join forces with the dis-
senters, and a majority would exist for the opposite result.
G. The Service Backtracks
The Abramson and Melvin cases undermined the position the Service took
in Technical Advice Memorandum 84-04-012.254 The often noted Technical
Advice Memorandum discussed a limited partnership involved in oil and gas
exploration. Each limited partner contributed cash, a promissory note, and
an irrevocable, transferable letter of credit to the partnership. Additionally,
each limited partner executed an assumption agreement with the partnership
by which the limited partners assumed and promised to pay a pro rata share
of a partnership loan. The partnership pledged the letters of credit and as-
sumption agreements to the creditor as security for the partnership loan.
From an objective view of the structure, the limited partners apparently
had done more than enough to earn the entitlement of including their pro
rata share of the loan in basis under section 752. The obligations of the
limited partners ran both to the lender, by way of the letter of credit given as
security, and to the partnership, via the assumption agreement. 255 The Ser-
vice nonetheless concluded that the limited partners were not entitled to in-
clude any portion of the liability in basis.25 6 Among the reasons for this
startling conclusion was the fact that the partnership remained primarily
liable on the debt. 257 According to the Service, in order to include a re-
course liability in basis under section 752, the partners had to become the
251. Pritchett v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 580, 585-91 (1985) (Judges Jacobs, Sterrett, Goffe,
Chabot, Parker, Shields, and Clapp), rev'd, 827 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1987).
252. Pritchett, 85 T.C. at 591-93 (Judges Simpson and Swift). Judges Sterrett and Goffe,
who voted with the majority, also concurred with Judge Simpson. Id. at 5 93.
253. Id. at 593-601 (Judges Whitaker, Nims, Korner, Cohen, Wright, Hamblen, and
Wilbur).
254. Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-04-012 (Oct. 13, 1983); see Winston, Basis and At-Risk Conse-
quences of a Partner's Assumption of Partnership Debt, 2 J. TAX'N INV. 15, 15 (1984) (T.A.M.
84-04-012 calls into question efficiency of partnership assumption arrangements); see also
Schwidetzky, Pool of Capital Doctrine: A Peace Proposal, 61 TUL. L. REV. 519, 530-36 (1986)
(discusses common law pool of capital doctrine in partnerships, whereby person may acquire
nontaxable partnership interest by contributing services or property toward acquisition, devel-
opment, and exploration of oil and gas); Hineman, Basis Considerations in Assumption and
Letter-of- Credit Arrangements, 2 J. TAX'N INV. 42, 42 (1984) (IRS put damper on assumption
arrangements with Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-04-012).
255. Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-04-012 (Oct. 13, 1983); see also supra notes 185-91, 234-41 and
accompanying text (partner's basis increased for share of partnership's recourse liabilities).
256. Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-04-012 (Oct. 13, 1983).
257. Id.
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primary obligors. 258 The Service also argued that any obligation of the lim-
ited partners to the partnership on the loan was too contingent, since the
loan was not due until four years after its consummation. 259 One may have
difficulty comprehending this latter position since the loan was due in all
events and, therefore, in no way contingent. Apparently, the Service re-
mained reluctant to give partners an increase in basis attributable to an obli-
gation not payable for four years. Regardless of the validity of that concern
the Service inappropriately created a contingency out of whole cloth. Fur-
ther, contrary to the Service's position, case law generally has supported the
inclusion of liabilities in the partnership interest bases, regardless of whether
the partnership possesses primary liability. 260 This Article discusses the pro-
priety of fully including liabilities in basis currently when they are not paya-
ble until a distant point in the future in more detail below.
The facts of the Technical Advice Memorandum were very similar to
those of Abramson and Melvin, in which the court held that the partnership
liability increased the limited partners' bases. 261 In an apparent response,
the Service issued Technical Advice Memorandum 86-36-003,262 which
withdrew and placed "under review" the conclusions expressed in Technical
Advice Memorandum 84-04-012 regarding basis. 263 The Service in Techni-
cal Advice Memorandum 86-36-003 then addressed the at risk issue raised
by the Technical Advice Memorandum 84-04-012. Given the taxpayer's
failure to obtain basis, no need to discuss at risk considerations originally
existed. 264 With the potential for basis resurrected, the at risk issue became
important. The Service essentially followed the reasoning of Abramson.
Since the limited partners ultimately stood solely liable for their shares of
the loan, the creditor could have brought a separate action against them for
collection, and they therefore bore "the economic risk associated with the
repayment of the [1]oan. ' ' 265 Accordingly, the Service considered each lim-
ited partner to be at risk for his share of the loan.26 6 This emphasis on
economic risk is both noteworthy and directly in conflict with the Service's
position in Pritchett, 267 when the limited partners also bore the ultimate eco-
nomic risk.
III. MEASURING LIABILITIES IN CURRENT DOLLARS
Although an abuse existed in Pritchett and may have existed in Technical
Advice Memorandum 84-04-012, neither section 465 nor section 752 is
designed to address such an abuse. Generally, section 752 allows a partner
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Proesel v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 992, 1004 (1981) (citing relevant case law).
261. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
262. Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-36-003 (Apr. 24, 1986) (issued before the Melvin decision, 88
T.C. 63 (1987)).
263. Id.
264. Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-04-012 (Oct. 13, 1983).
265. Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-38-003 (Apr. 24, 1986).
266. Id.
267. See supra notes 153-84 and accompanying text.
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to increase the partnership interest basis by the pro rata share of the face
amount of a partnership debt.2 68 In Pritchett the note did not bear interest
and was only due fifteen years after the date of its consummation. The cur-
rent value of the note was approximately twenty-five percent of its face
amount, assuming a ten percent present value rate. Accordingly, the limited
partners were entitled to a one dollar basis step up, and potentially one dol-
lar of associated deductions, while in effect assuming an obligation to pay in
current dollars approxomately twenty five cents. This situation is obviously
inappropriate and may have concerned the Pritchett court. The at risk rules,
however, were not the ideal place for the court to tackle the problem, since
these rules only consider financial exposure. The basis rules, on the other
hand, look to the taxpayer's investment. If the face amount of the note did
not properly reflect the taxpayer's investment, the court should have used
the basis rules to effect the necessary adjustment.
A. Original Issue Discount and Imputed Interest Rules
The Code's new rules concerning original issue discount2 69 and imputed
interest 2 70 should remedy the abuse that existed in Pritchett. A detailed dis-
cussion of these rules is beyond the scope of this undertaking. In short,
however, those provisions generally provide that if a loan charges a below
market rate of interest, the parties convert the principal of the loan into
interest in an amount sufficient to bring the interest rate up to market stan-
dards. 27 1 Subject to certain exceptions, 272 the debtor deducts the total inter-
est, and the creditor then includes such interest in annual income as it
accrues and not when it is paid, regardless of the debtor's and creditor's
methods of accounting.27 3 Converting principal into interest based on mar-
268. Abramson v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 360, 373-75 (1986); Smith v. Commissioner, 84
T.C. 889, 906-08 (1985).
269. I.R.C. §§ 1271-1275 (West Supp. 1987).
270. Id. §§ 483, 7872 (1987). Prior to the enactment of these sections, courts generally did
not impute interest. See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 576, 578 (1965) (sale of capital
asset received capital gains treatment despite taxpayer's retained interest in income produced
by asset); Montana Power Co. v. United States, 232 F.2d 541, 551 (3d Cir.) (asset-for-asset
exchange pursuant to reorganizations tax-free unless fair market value of assets received
greater than that of assets disposed), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956). But see Dickman v.
Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 340-42 (1984) (interest on gift-loan subject to tax).
271. I.R.C. §§ 483 (a)-(b), 1272, 1274(b), 7872(b) (West Supp. 1987). The interest rate is
limited to 8% for certain transactions when the unstated principal amount does not exceed
$2,800,000. Id. § 1274A. In addition, the § 1274A 9% limitation is compounded semi-annu-
ally. Id.; see also id. § 483(e) (interest rate shall not exceed 6% compounded semi-annually for
certain sales or exchanges of land to related parties).
272. Id. § 1674(c) exempts certain transactions from its coverage, for example: certain sales
for $1,000,000 or less, sales of principal residences, sales involving total payments of $250,000
or less, certain publicly traded property, certain sales of patents, and sales and exchanges
within § 483(e), which deals with land transfers between related parties. These exemptions
will fall within § 483, unless subject to the exemptions found in § 483(d). Section 483 does not
require annual accruals, and thus a cash method taxpayer will not have income until he re-
ceives the payments. Section 483, however, will still reclassify a portion of the payment as
interest. See id. § 483(a)-(b). Further, I.R.C. § 1274A(c) permits taxpayers on the cash
method of accounting to recognize gain or take deductions when payments are made if the
principal of the debt dues not exceed $2,000,000. Id. § 1274A(c).
273. See id. § 1272.
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ket interest rates reduces the principal to its present value. The taxpayer
should include that reduced principal in basis. 274 Liabilities therefore would
increase basis not by their face amount, but by their present value.
These rules were not in effect at the time the parties structured the Pritch-
ett transactions. Had they been, the parties would have reduced the princi-
pal of the loan to approximately twenty-five percent of the original face. If
the limited partners had included this lesser amount in basis, a fair result
would have been obtained. The seventy-five precent of the note no longer
included in basis would have reduced deductions, which the Code limits to
basis. Permitting the limited partners to then be at risk on the note would
not have perpetuated any abuse because the problem's solution would have
occurred at the basis level. This approach also avoids the necessity of deny-
ing the taxpayer's deductions by a tortured analysis of the at risk rules,
which raises more questions than it answers.
The present value rules now contained in the Code reduce the likelihood
that taxpayers will create Pritchett-type structures. Fairfield probably agreed
to a noninterest bearing loan in Pritchett because such a loan permitted Fair-
field to avoid the ordinary income otherwise incurred upon receipt of that
interest. 275 Instead, Fairfield received only principal, which to the extent it
exceeded the basis in the note might have constituted capital gain, taxable at
favorable rates at the time the transactions occurred. 276 Now that the Code
imputes interest and taxes capital gains at ordinary income rates, 2 77 the re-
sults will be quite different. A creditor will now obtain little or no benefit
from the Pritchett-type structure. Under the general rule, the creditor recog-
nizes interest income, while the debtor deducts such interest annually as the
interest accrues regardless of the taxpayers' method of accounting. 278 Addi-
tionally, no benefit to receiving capital gains will normally exist. In fact, the
creditor will be at a disadvantage if it accrues income annually, since the
creditor will not receive cash with which to pay the tax on that income.
Consequently, the creditor appears more likely to insist on appropriate inter-
est with payments made currently.
One final question concerns whether the original issue discount and im-
puted interest rules apply in this context. Neither rule discusses the inclu-
sion of liabilities in basis and, therefore, neither concludes that one may add
only the recomputed principal to basis, 2 7 9 though that conclusion seems in-
274. Interest is a liability and can be passed on to partners under I.R.C. § 752, but only
annually, as the liability arises. See generally id. §§ 165(a) (certain losses allowable as deduc-
tions), 165(b) (loss limit equals basis), 167(g) (depreciable basis rules), 704(d) (partner's loss
limited to basis in partnership interest) (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
275. Id. § 61(a)(4).
276. Id. §§ 1201, 1202, 1221 (1977).
277. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301, 100 Stat. 2219 (1986); see also
I.R.C.'§§ 1274, 7872 (West Supp. 1987). Individual taxpayers may deduct up to $3,000 of net
capital losses from ordinary income. I.R.C. §§ 1211(b), 1222(10) (West Supp. 1987).
278. One will obtain a different result if either § 483 or 1274A, both of which include
interest in income only when the taxpayer's method of accounting would require it, applies.
I.R.C. §§ 483, 1274A (West Supp. 1987).
279. But see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1272-1(j), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,053 (1986) (one shall increase
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escapable. Congress gave the Service the usual mega-delegation of authority
to issue regulations, 2 0 authority that should be broad enough to limit basis
to the recomputed principal. Even without those Code sections, however,
the courts and the Service possess the authority to limit a basis increase due
to a liability to the present value of that liability. 28 1 The basis rules focus on
investment, 28 2 and one best measures investments in current dollars,283 mak-
ing that the appropriate measure for the amount of liabilities included in
basis as well.
B. Another Alternative
One commentator, although recognizing that the present value methods
discussed above represent an improvement, prefers a different solution, due
to the following concerns.284 In the case of a Pritchett-type structure, the
Code now permits the debtor to take deductions for accrued but unpaid in-
terest. 28 5 The debtor could invest and earn income from the funds that the
debtor would have used to pay that interest. The tax savings from the inter-
est deductions and from the expense or depreciation deductions attributable
to the expenditure of the loan proceeds themselves can be invested and earn
income. 28 6 Given certain assumptions, such as a longer term loan, fifty per-
cent tax rate, and a ten percent pre-tax return, a debtor could possibly earn
sufficient income prior to the time he must pay the liability to offset large
amounts of the liability, and occasionally, the income could even exceed the
liability. 28 7 As a result, the Code is giving deductions attributable to liabili-
ties in excess of economic cost. Economic cost forms the cornerstone for
deductions. 288 These "cost-free liabilities" 28 9 conflict with that principle.
Assuming the situation involves an expense item, the proposed solution is to
use financial discounting and treat a future liability as a current expenditure
only in an amount that, if invested at current rates, would yield a sum, after
tax, sufficient to pay the liability, with interest. 290 This solution would allow
no additional deductions for interest in future years.29 1 The proposed solu-
tion would have to make appropriate adjustments in the case of the acquisi-
basis by amount of original issue discount in holder's gross income, and decrease it by amount
of payment, other than qualified interest, from issuer to holder).
280. I.R.C. § 1275(d) (West Supp. 1987).
281. See supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 12-30 and accompanying text.
283. See Johnson, Silk Purses From a Sow's Ear: Cost Free Liabilities under the Income
Tax, 3 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 231, 232-33 (1984) (Tax Reform Act of 1984 cuts back on tradi-
tional time blindness of tax law).
284. Id. at 242-58.
285. See I.R.C. §§ 1274, 7872 (West Supp. 1987) (interest rate determinations).
286. Johnson, supra note 283, at 231-42.
287. Id.
288. See generally I.R.C. § 162 (1987) (deductions allowed for all ordinary and necessary
expenses incurred in carrying on trade or business); B. BITTKER, supra note 14, 10, at 10-1
(discusses cost recovery, depreciation, and amortization).
289. See generally Johnson, supra note 283, at 231-38 ("Cost-free liabilities are a litmus test
of absurdity in a tax system.").
290. Id. at 239.
291. Id.
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tion of depreciable assets, which unlike expense items generate deductions
over time instead of only in the year of acquisition, but the focus would
remain the same.292
One can raise several objections to this proposal. First, it does not ade-
quately consider the role of the creditor, who will generally have to recog-
nize income currently. 293  As a consequence, the creditor will in all
probability insist on current payments, eliminating the availability of those
funds for investment and much of the potential for cost free liabilities.294 If
the creditor does not require current payments, he will nonetheless possess
current income and a current tax liability, which presumably he will attempt
to neutralize with higher interest rates. Those higher rates will offset the
relevant income earned by the debtor.
Second, the proposal is premised upon a post-tax yield. Given our gradu-
ated income tax structure those yields will vary from taxpayer to taxpayer.
Unless some average is used, the proposed system will have to be applied on
a case-by-case basis. The additional administrative burdens this necessity
would cause would be substantial in a tax system already stumbling under
the existing administrative load.295 Each taxpayer would have to review his
marginal tax rate before and after taking into account the benefits associated
with a liability. The impact on the tax rate could vary if the taxpayer's in-
come straddles the tax brackets. 296
This approach also conflicts with the entire structure of the Code, which
computes deductions on a pre-tax basis. Why stop with deductions arising
from liabilities? Other non-cash deductions, for example depreciation, can
create a similar impact. The proposal might require a complete restructur-
ing of the tax system, potentially yielding few real benefits. The benefit of
the present value system of the Code contained in the original issue discount
and imputed interest rules, with its use of pre-tax values, is that it addresses
the problem of under and/or unstated interest without violating the general
premises of the tax system. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also generally
reduces the maximum marginal rates to twenty-eight percent for individuals
and thirty-four percent for corporations. 297 This reduces the value of the
debtor's tax deductions and the consequent tax savings. As a result fewer
tax savings to invest will exist, which will reduce any return, and increase
292. Id. at 285-87.
293. Professor Johnson's argument contains greater merit if either § 483 or 1274A applies.
Sections 483 and 1274A(c) do not require current inclusion for, respectively, certain property
dispositions and certain loans with principal amounts up to $2,000,000, if the creditor uses the
cash method of accounting. Instead, the creditor will only include income when the cash
method of accounting requires it. The typical commercial lender uses the accrual method of
accounting, however, requiring current inclusion. See I.R.C. §§ 483, 1274A(c) (West Supp.
1987).
294. The benefits of expense or depreciation deductions attributable to the expenditure of
the loan proceeds would still exist, though the taxpayer's after tax interest costs would now
partially offset them.
295. Professor Johnson acknowledges this difficulty. See Johnson, supra note 283, at 284-
85.
296. See I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 1987) (sets tax rates of 15 and 28 percent).
297. See id. §§ l(g)-(h), 11.
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the amount of time required to offset meaningful portions of the liability,
thereby reducing the extent of the problem. 298
Finally, the proposal represents an indictment of accrual accounting,
which always permits deductions without outlays. 299 One should recall that
accrual accounting also requires the inclusion of income without receipt. 3° °
Furthermore, cash accounting can also lead to abuses. 30 1 Although a debate
over accrual and cash accounting is thankfully beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, accrual accounting came into being to correct cash method of account-
ing distortions. 30 2 Nonetheless, the present value approach is complex and
can eventually become a taxpayer's nightmare, as well as an accountant's
dream. Taxpayers who fail to charge the proper interest rate will be able to
obtain tax deductions for the computer they will need to purchase in order
to calculate the alternative statutory interest.3 0 3
C. A Modest Proposal
A simpler solution would require that as a condition precedent to inclu-
sion in basis, or to expense deduction, liabilities be incurred at prevailing
interest rates. Requiring the interest rate to be correct at the outset would
eliminate the need for complex recalculation. One argument against this ap-
proach would be its potential harshness. Failure to meet its requirements
could result in bona fide liabilities receiving no tax benefits. Permitting the
parties to retroactively amend the loan documents to change the interest rate
appropriately can solve this dilemma. The deductions could then be allowed
while the abuse is simultaneously avoided.
IV. PASSIVE Loss RULES
Tax shelters provided a focal point for congressional deliberations during
the drafting of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.304 Congress viewed tax shelters
as an egregious abuse of the Code mandating corrective action.30 5 The
premise appeared questionable since tax shelters only have a small effect on
298. See Johnson, supra note 283, at 285.
299. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1985); see also United States v. Ander-
son, 269 U.S. 422, 441-42 (1925) (permitted accrual basis taxpayer to deduct tax "reserve" on
books, even though not yet assessed).
300. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1985).
301. See generally Helvering v. Enright, 312 U.S. 636, 645 (1941) (permitted accrual for
estimated receipts of deceased member of law firm for unfinished business); Zaninovich v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 605, 606 (1978) (taxpayers took deduction on 1973 tax return for
rental payments for use of land in 1974, and for which they actually paid in 1973); see also
I.R.C. § 467 (West Supp. 1987) (taxpayer may use accrual method for certain rental agree-
ments); B. BITTKER, supra note 14, 35.2(1), at 35-13 ("Tax theorists regard cash-basis
accounting as less accurate than accrual accounting .... ").
302. See Wilkinson-Beane, Inc. v. Commissioner, 420 F.2d 352, 354 (1st Cir. 1970) (Com-
missioner may select type of accounting method that most properly reflects taxpayer's in-
come); ELLIS & THACKER, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING, ch. 10, at 300 (1980).
303. I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(B)(iv) (West Supp. 1987).
304. SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON H.R. 3838, S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong.,
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governmental revenues. 30 6 Congress, however, doubtlessly achieved the ob-
jective of bringing the tax shelter industry to its knees with the enactment of
the passive loss rules of section 469.307 The author will limit this discussion
of section 469 to the basic aspects of the changes, their affect on liabilities,
and why the passive loss rules represent an unnecessary and misdirected ap-
proach to a problem that other Code changes had already remedied.
A. The Basics
Section 469 puts the tax world into baskets. One is active and outside its
ambit, the other is passive and victimized by the draconian approach of sec-
tion 469.308 Individuals, fiduciaries, partners, S corporation shareholders,
certain personal service corporations, and closely held corporations are sub-
ject to the passive loss rules. 30 9 Section 469 requires these persons to place
their gains and losses in one of the baskets. Generally, any activity other
than a trade or business in which the taxpayer materially participates falls
into the passive basket. 310 In order to materially participate, the taxpayer
must be involved in the operations of the activity on a regular, continuous,
and substantial basis. 31' The section deems all limited partnership participa-
tions and all rental activities to be passive activities.312
Subsection (a) of section 469 provides the muscle. This subsection states
that taxpayers may only deduct aggregate passive activity losses from aggre-
gate passive activity income. Taxpayers may not deduct passive activity
losses from active income such as salary and wages. Taxpayers also may not
deduct passive activity losses from portfolio income, Which includes gross
income from interest, dividends, annuities, or royalties not derived in the
ordinary course of a trade or business. 313 Wealthier taxpayers easily generate
and regularly incur portfolio income and would probably still possess ample
306. In 1986 the federal government collected approximately 790 billion dollars in total tax
revenues. See Facts and Figures on Government Finance, 23 TAx FOUND., INC., at C-I (1986).
"Public Citizen," a Ralph Nader organization, projected that tax shelters would result in 24
billion dollars in lost revenue for 1986. See Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1985, at 64, col. 4. This
amount constitutes approximately 3.1% of revenues.
307. I.R.C. § 469 (West Supp. 1987); see also Brode, supra note 7, at 290 (new passive loss
rules extremely broad and impact real estate developers and passive investors).
308. I.R.C. § 469(a) (West Supp. 1987); see also Tucker & Schwinger, TRA 1986 Will Have
a Pervasive Impact Upon Real Estate Transactions, 66 J. TAX'N 130, 130 (1987) (after 1986
Tax Act, tax losses will become less important and cash flow will become more important in
real estate); Brode, supra note 7, at 290 (new § 469 will cause real estate developers to restrict
form of doing business).
309. I.R.C. § 469(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987); see also Committee Report, supra note 304, at
721-22 (passive loss rules apply to individuals as well as certain businesses to ensure that tax-
payers do not circumvent rules).
310. I.R.C. §§ 469(c)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1987). A taxpayer can be in the trade or business
of being an employee. Noland v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 885 (1959). A trade or business also includes research and experimentation activities, as
defined in § 174, and to the extent provided in regulations, any activity with respect to which
expenses are allowable as a deduction under § 212. I.R.C. § 469(c)(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1987).
311. I.R.C. § 469(h)(1)(A)-(C) (West Supp. 1987).
312. See id. §§ 469(c)(2), (h)(2) (1987). But see id. § 469(i) (offset for rental real estate
activities); Committee Report, supra note 304, at 719-21; Brode, supra note 7, at 290-95.
313. I.R.C. §§ 469(a), (d)-(e) (West Supp. 1987).
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incentive to invest in tax shelters if the resulting losses could reduce that
portfolio income, notwithstanding the fact the losses could not reduce active
income.31 4 This situation would have kept the taxshelter industry alive and
well, contrary to Congress's intent.
The Code mercifully allows individuals to deduct up to $25,000 of excess
passive losses attributable to rental real estate from their active income if the
individuals actively participate in the rental activity. 3 15 The active participa-
tion standard requires less involvement than the material participation stan-
dard, but does require a meaningful involvement.3 16 The taxpayer, for
example, meets the active participation standard by making "management
decisions or arranging for others to provide services ... in a significant and
bonafide sense."' 31 7 The $25,000 deduction is reduced by fifty percent of the
amount by which the taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds $100,000.318
Thus, the deduction will be totally phased out for taxpayers with adjusted
gross incomes of $150,000 or greater. This provision, therefore, will not ben-
efit wealthier taxpayers.
A taxpayer may carry forward passive losses that he cannot use currently
to future years that contain passive income.31 9 When a taxpayer fully dis-
poses of a passive interest in a taxable transaction, the taxpayer may deduct
any associated, unused passive losses from active income to the extent there
exists insufficient passive income to offset them. 3 20 The passive loss rules
apply to passive losses occurring after January 1, 1987, even if the taxpayer
made the original investment giving rise to the losses before that time.32'
The full impact of the provisions, however, is mercifully phased in over five
years for investments made before August 16, 1986, which represents the
date the Conference Committee reported on the tax reform act. 32 2 Revenue
needs arising from a passionate attachment to a maximum individual rate of
twenty-eight percent constituted the principal reason Congress applied sec-
tion 469 retroactively.3 23
The practical effect of the passive loss rules is to bring the tax shelter era
314. Committee Report, supra note 304, at 713-18, 722.
315. I.R.C. § 469(i) (West Supp. 1987).
316. Id. § 469(i)(6); see also Committee Report, supra note 304, at 719-21, 736-38. The
Code will not consider an individual to actively participate if his interest in the real estate
activity is less than 10% by value. I.R.C. § 469(i)(6)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
317. Committee Report, supra note 304, at 737. Relevant management decisions include
approving new tenants, deciding on rental terms, approving capital or repair expenditures, and
other similar decisions. Id. at 737-38. No active participation requirement exists for low in-
come housing and rehabilitation credits. I.R.C. § 469(a)(i)(6)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
318. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1987). The phase out for low income housing and
rehabilitation credits begins with adjusted gross incomes of $200,000 and, therefore, is com-
pletely phased out once the adjusted gross income equals or exceeds $250,000. Id.
§ 469(i)(3)(B).
319. Id. § 469(b).
320. Id. § 469(g).
321. Id. § 469(l).
322. Id. A taxpayer may deduct from nonpassive income the following percentages of pas-
sive losses arising from the lesser of such pre-enactment interests or overall annual passive
losses: 1987 - 67%, 1988 - 40%, 1989 -20%, and 1990 - 10%. Id.
323. Telephone interview with Minority Senate Finance Committee Staff (March 31, 1987).
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to a close. Taxpayers generally participate in tax shelters in order to obtain
losses that they may deduct from their income. Since the investment usually
takes the form of a limited partnership interest, or the structure is such that
the taxpayer cannot satisfy the material participation standard, those losses
will be passive. Taxpayers' income is typically from wages, interest, divi-
dends, and royalties, which is active or portfolio income. Under the new
rules, taxpayers generally may not deduct the former from the latter, and
therefore, a principal motivation for participation in tax shelters, at least as
historically structured, will no longer exist. If tax shelters were inherently
evil, one could justify section 469. They are not, and one cannot.
B. Critique
Unquestionably, some abuses continued in spite of the enactment of the at
risk rules of section 465 and the judicial responses to the use of liabilities
discussed earlier. 324 As noted, taxpayers could include the face amount of
debt in basis notwithstanding its interest provisions or payment terms.325
The imputed interest and the original issue discount rules, which denomi-
nate a portion of principal as interest when inadequate interest provisions
are contained in the loan documents, however, should largely remedy this
problem. 326 These rules should limit the basis inclusion to the present value
of the debt and prevent the abuse presented in the Pritchett case.
Congress originally permitted very rapid accelerated depreciation deduc-
tions over time periods that bore no relationship to a property's useful life,
particularly in the case of real estate. 32 7 As a consequence, taxpayers gener-
ated depreciation deductions in such large amounts that taxpayers were con-
structing buildings for the enjoyment of the tax consequences rather than for
serious economic considerations. 328 The 1986 Act remedied the unfortunate
situation, created by Congress itself, with the elongation of depreciation pe-
riods and the limitation on depreciation for real estate to straight line over
twenty-seven and one-half years for residential property and thirty-one and
one-half years for commercial property.329
The tax benefits of the erstwhile rapid depreciation schedules for real es-
tate particularly became potent when coupled with the fact that the at risk
rules did not apply to real estate.330 Taxpayers could incur large amounts of
nonrecourse debt, often of dubious legitimacy, with its concomitant basis
increase. Taxpayers generated large depreciation deductions and investment
324. See supra notes 66-196 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 269-82 and accompanying text.
327. See generally I.R.C. § 168(b)(2) (1986) (permitted accelerated depreciation for real
estate over 19 years).
328. See Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 861-62 (1973) (taxpayer formed corpora-
tions to purchase real estate on 10 different occasions between 1963-1966); Boom in Tax Shel-
ters Artificially Lifts Prices of Much Real Estate, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 6 (tax
shelters may constitute one-half of commercial property sales, which results in 15-20% higher
prices).
329. I.R.C. § 16(c) (West Supp. 1987).
330. Id. § 465(c)(3)(D).
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tax credits, often with limited, if any, concern for the risk and economics,
since no personal liability existed.3 3 1 Congress remedied this part of the
problem by subjecting real estate to the reach of at risk rules. 332 The one
exception occurs when the nonrecourse loans meet normal commercial
terms. 33 3 The debt incurred therefore should arise in reasonable amounts,
thereby eliminating the abuse potential.
3 34
The discussed changes help insure that tax consequences will follow eco-
nomic realties and that taxpayers, when considering a proposed investment,
will look at the economic returns as well as the tax benefits. The opportu-
nity to increase basis with low interest, high principal debt, and generate
accelerated depreciation deductions that bear no resemblance to economic
depreciation will no longer exist. Further, incurring unrealistic amounts of
nonrecourse debt in real estate settings will no longer serve any tax purposes.
C. The Downside
If Congress had stopped with the changes discussed above, few could have
raised significant arguments with either the concerns or solutions. Unfortu-
nately, Congress went further. The passive loss rules disallow legitimate
losses from legitimate activities until those activities generate income, simply
because the activities may, arbitrarily, be classified as passive.33 5
The passive loss rules neutralize the inclusion of liabilities in basis. A
passive investor may incur debt for a passive activity, receive the associated
basis increase, have genuine financial exposure, and be at risk, but the tax-
payer may not take deductions attributable to expenditure of the loan pro-
ceeds except to the extent passive income is generated. 336 The Code no
longer focuses on the genuineness of the liability and the associated invest-
ment. For reasons that have nothing to do with either, the passive loss rules
simply are postponing certain deductions. Such rules are a far cry from the
heralded desire to make the Code economically neutral. On the contrary,
these rules encourage taxpayers to invest in activities that generate short-
term income, and discourage them from investing in activities that incur
short-term losses, except generally, to the extent that they materially partici-
pate. The rules will presumably foreclose entrepreneurs whose proposals
will not generate early income from access to the large capital markets repre-
sented by passive investors. Further, since the typical business venture does
not earn income until several years into the development cycle, the entrepre-
neur may not have the initial opportunity to receive the necessary invest-
ment to get started. 337 The new Code will not, therefore, just put an end to
331. See supra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
332. I.R.C. § 465(c) (West Supp. 1987).
333. See supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.
334. I.R.C. § 465(b)(6) (West Supp. 1987).
335. Pritchett v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 580, 593 (1985) (Whitaker, J., dissenting), rev'd,
827 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1987).
336. I.R.C. § 469(d) (West Supp. 1987).
337. Fifty-seven percent of businesses fail within the first five years of organization. See
Failures by Age of Business by Industry, BUSINESS FAILURE RECORD 17, 17 (1984).
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abusive tax shelters, whose life expectancy was already shortened by the
other tax changes discussed above, but put an end to many legitimate invest-
ments as well.
With these changes, the Code also moves away from an income tax system
and toward something more akin to a consumption tax system, when con-
sumption rather than income is taxed.338 Now the Code will not allow
many losses when they are incurred, but only later when income is earned,
or the interest in the activity is sold. The focus appears not on the invest-
ment, but on the nature of the activity, not on the economics, but on the
nature of the receipts. The problem that arises is that Congress only went
part of the way down this path. Now a somewhat confused jumble of in-
come and consumption tax provisions that may not work well together, and
which may give rise to economic disincentives, exist. Unless Congress
wishes to complete its journey to a consumption tax system, which appears
unlikely, section 469 cannot be justified and should be repealed.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress has included liabilities in basis for reasons of policy and practi-
cality. As is often the case, however, this step could not be taken alone, and
a number of supplemental judicial, congressional, and regulatory reactions
have arisen to deal with certain abuses. The focus of all such responses
should be on the legitimacy of the taxpayer's investment, or in this context,
on the genuineness of the liability and the taxpayer's economic exposure.
With these two concerns allayed, tax consequences should follow economic
consequences.
The courts appropriately insisted that any contingencies to which a liabil-
ity is subject not be so great as to call into question its very existence. 339
Similarly, nonrecourse debt is purely metaphysical if the fair market value of
the collateral does not equal or exceed the debt, for the debtor possesses no
incentive to insure the viability of an economic activity the benefits of which
will accrue to his creditor. Hence the reaction of the Tax Court in Franklin.
The potential for an excessive use of nonrecourse debt was so great that
Congress decided to take it off the typical playing field with the at risk rules.
Section 465 insists on genuine economic exposure. Unfortunately, in Pritch-
ett, the Tax Court ignored the economic exposure analysis and refused to
consider taxpayers at risk, notwithstanding the fact that the taxpayers had
clearly met the letter and the spirit of section 465.340 The court seemed
more concerned with formalism than substance.34 1 Other courts should re-
ject the Tax Court's analysis in Pritchett and follow the reasoning of the
338. Aaron & Galper, A Tax on Consumption, Gifts, and Bequests and Other Strategies for
Reform, OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM 106, 106-07 (Brookings Inst. 1984).
339. See supra notes 73-97 and accompanying text.
340. See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 580, 595-96 (1985) (Whitaker, J., dissenting)
(majority's application of § 465 failed to recognize relationship between basis and at risk provi-
sions), rev'd, 827 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1987).
341. See Pritchett, 85 T.C. at 598 (Whitaker, J., dissenting) (court's approach in Pritchett
creates bad percent for genuine business transactions).
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Ninth Circuit. The Tax Court should reconsider its position. The proper
focus is that of Abramson and Melvin: whether the taxpayer possesses ade-
quate exposure. Form should not control substance.
From its creation the Code has ignored something known by every sopho-
more business student; a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow.
The refusal to adopt a present value test permitted liabilities with under-
stated interest to overstate basis. Both the Service and the courts could have
responded by insisting that basis represent a taxpayer's investment, which is
best measured in current dollars. The Service and the courts unfortunately
have not taken this position, which has lead to alternative responses such as
the Tax Court's fanciful at risk analysis in Pritchett. Congress has, indi-
rectly, remedied the omission with the defensible, if highly complex, imputed
interest and original issue discount rules. 34 2 Although these rules deal with
the problem, their complexity constitutes a major limitation on their utility.
Perhaps a simpler solution, from the perspective of computing basis, would
require adequate interest as a precondition to including a liability in basis,
with appropriate provisions to safeguard equity.
Although the problems were never as great as many would have us be-
lieve, tax shelters have resulted in certain abuses. In a system where volun-
tary compliance is vital, the system's success requires assuring taxpayers that
everyone is paying a fair share of taxes, including wealthy tax shelter inves-
tors. In section 469, however, Congress overreacted. Congress originally
gave taxpayers overly generous investment tax credits and depreciation de-
ductions, and then appeared surprised when taxpayers took advantage of
them. Congress could have recognized that it had created the problem, and
limited the solution to reducing the availability of those tax benefits. With
section 469, however, Congress also excoriated all loss activities that have
passive investors, regardless of their long-term value, economic benefits, or
legitimacy. Equity gave way to the desperate search for revenues, and in-
vestments made before the enactment of section 469 became subject to its
graceless approach.
The objective of an income tax system is to tax economic income. Cre-
ators and administrators of such a system must take precautionary steps to
insure that tax deductions correspond to economic outlays. When provi-
sions such as section 469 prohibit legitimate deductions, however, the system
no longer achieves its objectives. The focus has shifted from raising ade-
quate revenues through adequate tax rates, to maintaining arbitrarily se-
lected tax rates and obtaining the lost revenue through the equally arbitrary
disallowance of deductions for bona fide expenditures. This shift can only
have the effect of limiting legitimate economic activities, in particular, those
activities that produce early losses. The result of this approach could ad-
versely impact the economy in general, and the perception of the fairness of
the tax system in particular. Further, the adverse economic impact may re-
duce income and the associated taxes, potentially causing a revenue loss
342. I.R.C. §§ 483, 1271-1275, 7872 (West Supp. 1987).
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greater than any revenue gains attributable to section 469. If Congress
wanted more revenue it should have raised rates or equitably curbed deduc-
tions. Section 469's carte blanche disallowance of losses unfairly penalizes
good-faith business activities. It should be recognized as a mistake and
repealed.

